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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
Signcryption is a topic which considers the direct form implementation of symmetric cipher 
and digital signature. Confidentiality and authenticity are two main goals in cryptography. These 
two goals can be achieved by the two cryptographic primitives - encryption and digital signature -
separately. The word "signcryption" is a relatively new cryptographic primitive which is used to 
produce a message satisfying the above two goals in a single logical step. Not only signcryption 
can produce a secure and authenticated message in a single step, but also it provides a more 
computational efficient algorithm than the traditional method - “digital signature followed by 
encryption". 
Delegation of rights and dissemination of rights are the common practices in many 
commercial organizations. These two tasks can be accomplished by proxy signature and threshold 
scheme respectively. In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer delegates its power of 
issuing digital signature to a proxy signer. In a (r, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, any 
combination of t members of a group of n members together can recover the group secret. 
Nevertheless, non-repudiation is also crucial to many e-commerce applications. It refers to the 
futility of a signer to deny its signature. In many real life applications, delegation of rights to a 
group of agents to jointly exercise the rights is a useful and desirable property. In this thesis, a (/， 
n) threshold signcryption scheme is proposed. Based on this proposed threshold signcryption 
scheme, a proxy feature is introduced to it and eventually turns that scheme to a (t’ n) threshold 
proxy signcryption scheme. Finally, the (t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme is further 
extended to a new {t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme with the support of non-repudiation. 
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In many real world and e-commerce applications, confidentiality and authenticity are both 
the desired properties. Confidentiality ensures the secrecy of the information while authenticity 
enables communicating parties to ensure the identities of each another. In real world, 
confidentiality can be easily accomplished by designing a new communication language for a 
group of people. By using such language during the communication, only the designated parties 
in the group can understand the semantic of the message. Meanwhile, authenticity can also be 
easily accomplished by the hand-written signature. 
In order to have electronic version counterparts, a way to minimize or eliminate the need of 
a secure channel to distribute a secret key is required, as it is usually not feasible for the 
communicating parties to have a face-to-face agreement. Similarly, digital version signature must 
also be designed to have as many properties as that hand-written signature has, namely 
authenticity, unforgeablity, unalterability, non-reusability and non-repudiation. 
In this chapter, a preview to the topic title of this thesis is given in section 1.1. A more 
comprehensive overview and development timelines are given in section 1.2. In section 1.3，some 
recent progresses on the digital signcryption are discussed. In section 1.4’ a brief description on 
each chapter and the organization of this thesis are included. 
1.1 Preview of this thesis 
Nowadays, almost every people know what is meant by "WWW" (World Wide Web). In this 
section, I am going to talk about "WWW". However, this "WWW" doesn't stand for World Wide 
Web. Instead, it stands for three "what" questions - "What is Signcryption?", "What is Proxy?", 
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and "What is Threshold?". The meaning of this thesis topic is dissected into three dimensions, 
which correspond to the above three "what" questions. In this section, the concepts of 
signcryption, proxy, and threshold are introduced in a general sense and explained by some 
examples or stories. 
1.1.1 What is Signcryption? 
The word "Signcryption" comes from two English words, which are Signature and 
Encryption. It carries two layers of meaning - authenticity and confidentiality. Signcryption can 
be viewed as a method or a mechanism that can let one entity, A, produce a message, which is 
knowledgeable and authenticable to a particular entity, B. That means only the designated entity B 
can read and understand the message as well as the entity B has confidence in believing that the 
message is actually coming from the entity A. 
To have a better understanding, let's take a look on the following example. This example 
involves two parties, Alice and Bob. When Alice wants to talk somethings to Bob, she first writes 
down what she wants to talk in a draft paper. After that, for each word she wrote down, she would 
search that word in the bible and write down the section number, line number, and word number 
in another paper. Thereby, she puts this paper into an envelope and seals it with the sealing wax. 
Alice then sends this letter to Bob. When Bob receives this letter, he uses the section numbers, 
line numbers and word numbers to lookup the bible and constructs the original message. 
In the above example, only Bob can understand the message. Even though the postman 
opens the envelope in transit, he just can read a sequence of number and can't understand the 
meaning. Moreover, as the envelope is sealed with the sealing wax, no one can tamper the content 
of the letter without producing any noticeable traces. Such sealing can also act as a kind of 
authentication of the identity of Alice to Bob. 
1.1.2 What is Proxy? 
According to Oxford Dictionary, the word proxy refers to the agency of one who acts by 
appointment instead of another or the action of a substitute or deputy. In order words, the word 
"proxy" means the delegation of some authoritative rights to someone such that he/she can 
exercise such rights on behalf of the principal. 
In daily life, there are a lot of cases involving delegation of rights. For example, when 
executive director of a company is not available, the company wants to have another trusted 
person to send out the message on his/her behalf. 
1.1.3 What is Threshold? 
In cryptographic sense, the word "threshold" refers to the division of something into a 
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number of parts. Let's consider the historical story of treasure hunt. In this story, the map for the 
treasure is usually divided into a number of parts, which are known as secret shares, the hunter 
needs to collect all pieces of secret shares so as to know the location of the treasure. It is just one 
of the applications of threshold scheme. 
Another useful application is to avoid giving too much authoritative right to a single agency 
in the proxy scheme, which is described above. It can be easily understood by considering some 
saving accounts provided by a bank. Usually, a bank will provide a saving account type, which is 
called "joint-signatures saving account". This type of saving account requires all the authoritative 
signers, whose signatures appeared in the passbook, to sign in order to withdrawal the money in 
the account. This explains what the word "threshold" means. 
1.2 Development Timelines 
In several decades ago, how to achieve confidentiality without secret key distribution 
channel and authenticity were the two open problems in the cryptography. Until 1976, W. Diffie 
and M. Hellman started to address these open problems by introducing the concepts of public key 
cryptography [1]. With the invention of public key cryptography, it made digital signing and 
asymmetric encryption possible. 
In general, encryption is employed to provide the confidentiality while digital signature is 
used to provide the authenticity. If the application requires the sender of the message to be 
authenticated and the content of the message to be secured, usually digital signature is applied 
followed by the process of asymmetric encryption. This traditional two-steps approach has been 
used widely. However, the cost on performing a signature operation followed by encryption is 
relatively high, some people may ask that are there any cheaper solutions which can transmit or 
store message or information in a secure and authenticated way. This question has never been 
answered positively until 1997. 
In 1997, Zheng proposed a digital signcryption scheme [2] to address the above question. In 
[2], a new cryptographic primitive known as "digital signcryption" can satisfy the properties of 
digital signature, and encryption simultaneously in a logically one step. Meanwhile, the cost of 
digital signcryption is significantly lower than the cost of the operation "digital signature 
followed by encryption". 
Another important common practice in business is the delegation of rights. In 1996，the 
concept of delegation of rights has been introduced in the area of digital signature by M. Mambo, 
K. Usuda and E. Okamoto [3] and it is termed as proxy signature. Proxy signature is just the 
beginning of the proxy cryptography [4]. Following the proxy signature, there are some proxy 
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encryption schemes, proxy identification schemes, and eventually, proxy signcryption schemes. 
Proxy signcryption scheme was firstly proposed by C. Gamage, J. Leiwo, and Y. Zheng in 
1999 [5]. It enables a principal to delegate its authority in producing signcryption to a trusted 
proxy agent. Proxy signcryption is primarily used to address the problem of insufficient hardware 
resources to perform the digital signcryption process. 
However, when the principal delegates his/her rights to a proxy agent, he has no way to 
control the behavior of the proxy agent. The proxy agent may behave badly that he/she may 
violates the original goal of the principal. This problem can be greatly loosen provided that the 
delegation is distributed to a group of proxy agents and the participations of all proxy agents are 
required to produce the signcryption. It is known as group signcryption. How about if one of 
proxy agent is malfunctioning or can't be located? If it is the case, all other proxy agents can't do 
things on behalf of the principal under group signcryption scheme. Threshold cryptography is 
introduced. 
In a threshold proxy signcryption scheme, at least t proxy agents in the designated group are 
required to produce a valid authenticated and encrypted message on behalf of the original person, 
principal. 
Meanwhile, non-repudiation is also a crucial issue. The term "repudiation" refers to an act to 
refuse, reject to accept or entertain some things in Oxford English Dictionary. In the area of 
cryptology, non-repudiation has the meaning that the person can't deny what he/she has done in 
later time when he/she actually did it. 
In this thesis, the threshold proxy signcryption scheme is extended to a new non-repudiated 
threshold proxy signcryption scheme, in which no proxy agents and the principal can deny they 
have signcrypted a message if one actually did it. 
1.3 Recent progress on signcryption 
In November 2000 news [6], IBM revealed a new secure method for digitally scrambling 
and signing data in which IBM claimed it was faster than the traditional techniques by twice. This 
secure method indeed utilizes the combination of encryption-authentication technique. IBM 
believed that this technique is especially suitable to make the mobile communications secure. It is 
because such technique can lower the processor and hardware requirements. 
Recently, Back, et al. [7] have done the formal security proof on the digital signcryption. 
They proved that digital signcryption scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack 
in the random oracle model relative to the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem [8] and is existentially 
unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model relative to the 
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discrete logarithm problem. At the same time, An, et al. [9] also conducted the study on the 
security of the joint signature and encryption scheme, particularly the digital signcryption scheme. 
Based on these two results, we can believe that the digital signcryption is secure and unforgeable. 
The securities of the schemes to be proposed in this thesis are based on the above provable secure 
digital signcryption scheme. 
1.4 Organization of this thesis 
This thesis emphasizes on the topics of constructing threshold signcryption scheme, and 
threshold proxy signcryption with add-on features. The organization of the rest of the chapters of 
this thesis is as follow. 
In Chapter 2, basic cryptographic backgrounds are introduced, which include the six 
cryptographic primitives, symmetric and asymmetric cryptographies, discrete logarithm based 
and integer factorization based cryptosystems. Besides, some digital signature schemes, such as 
Nyberg-Rueppel, DSS, Schnorr signature schemes, are also discussed. In addition, blind signature 
technique and threshold scheme are also reviewed. 
In Chapter 3，some previous works about digital signcryption scheme are reviewed. It 
begins by discussing the traditional "Signature-then-Encryption" scheme approach and followed 
by Zheng's Digital Signcryption Scheme, Chung's Proxy Signcryption Scheme and an Improved 
Digital Signcryption scheme. 
In Chapter 4，two Threshold Signcryption schemes are presented. The first part presents {t, n) 
threshold signcryption scheme, which is a general threshold signcryption scheme. The second 
part presents a {n, n) threshold signcryption scheme with improved complexity, which is a 
specific case to the former but has an easier implementation. 
In Chapter 5, the (r, n) threshold signcryption scheme proposed in Chapter 4 is extended to a 
(r, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme, in which it can let the principal to delegate the 
signcryption rights to a group of proxy agencies. 
In Chapter 6，the 0，n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme proposed in Chapter 5 is further 
extended to include the support of the non-repudiation. By means of non-repudiation, no 
participating parties can deny his/her acts at later time. 
In Chapter 7, it is the conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
Introduction to Cryptography 
Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of information 
security such as confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication, and data authentication [10]. 
Indeed, these aspects are the cryptographic goals that almost all cryptographic protocols want to 
achieve. In the past, cryptographic systems, also known as cryptosystems，are designed to protect 
the secrecy of information during communication and computation in military organization. 
During the twentieth century, the blooming of Internet has been making more and more people 
aware the significance of cryptography and cryptography has been utilized in the application of 
global communications. Nowadays, the explosion of E-commerce makes the word, Cryptography, 
become more and more popular. Many cryptographic techniques have been used in many daily 
life electronic applications. The reason for the need of cryptography is that transmitting data over 
Internet is insecure as an adversary can eavesdrop, intercept, or even alter part or all of the 
transmitted data from the communication channel. The objective of cryptography is to design an 
algorithm to keep the message secret. 
Basically, cryptography provides different kinds of security [11], namely perfect secrecy, 
statistical security and computational security. With computational security, the computational 
effort for the adversary to break the code is dramatically higher than the computational effort of 
the intended users to decipher the message with their privileged information (decryption key). 
The important point of cryptography to note is that there is no absolute security, or perfect 
secrecy in any cryptosystem except one-time pad cryptographic scheme, the security levels of all 
cryptosystems are just computational security, or statistical security. 
In this chapter, fundamental cryptographic theories related to this thesis will be discussed. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In section 2.1, I will introduce six cryptographic 
primitives qualitatively. The aim of this section is to give a general overview of these primitives. 
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In section 2.2 and 2.3，Discrete Logarithm Based Cryptosystem and Integer Factorization Based 
Cryptosystem are discussed respectively. Various digital signature schemes, such as RSA, 
ElGamal, DSS, SDSS, Nyberg-Rueppel, and Schnorr signature schemes, are reviewed in section 
2.4. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange is discussed in section 2.5. In section 2.6, the concept of Blind 
Signature is introduced. Threshold scheme is in section 2.7. 
2.1 Cryptographic Primitives 
Cryptographic protocol is composed of six basic primitives, namely symmetric 
cryptography, asymmetric cryptography, digital signature, hashing function, digital certificate, 
and zero knowledge proof. In this section, these primitives will be introduced qualitatively. The 
detailed discussions are on the following sections. 
2.1.1 Symmetric Cryptography 
In classical cryptography, there are two major categories of cryptosystems, namely 
symmetric cryptosystem, and asymmetric cryptosystem. Symmetric cryptosystem is also known 
as secret key or private key cryptosystem. 
In secret key cryptosystem, both the encryption key and the decryption key are the same. 
That means both communicating parties use the same key in the process of encryption and 
decryption of the message. That's why it is also called symmetric cryptosystem. 
Suppose Alice wants to send a message to Bob securely, they need to agree on the key and 
the algorithm to be used before hand. The details are as follow: 
Let k be the key used in the encryption and decryption processes,五众（.）be the encryption 
process, D众(.)be the corresponding decryption process, and M be the plaintext message to be 
transmitted. 
1. Alice passes message M as an input to the encryption function E^ (.) and gets the 
cipher text C as an output. 
C = E,{M) 
2. Alice sends the cipher text, C, to Bob over an insecure channel 
3. When Bob receives the cipher text, C, he performs the decryption process on C to get 
the message M. 
M 二 Z)“C) 
Usually, symmetric cryptosystems are used to encrypt bulk data as the speed of symmetric 
cryptosystems are very fast. However, the drawback of symmetric cryptosystems is the key 
distribution problem. 
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Data Encryption Standard, DES [12, 13], International Data Encryption Algorithm, IDEA 
[14], Triple DES [15], RC2, RC4, RC5 and CAST-128 are some examples of secret key 
cryptosystem. 
2.1.2 Asymmetric Cryptography 
Asymmetric cryptosystem is another category of cryptosystem. Asymmetric cryptosystem is 
also known as public key cryptosystem. In public key cryptosystem, the encryption key, which is 
well known by all parties over the world, and the decryption key, which is only known by the 
owner and should be kept in a secure place, are not the same. Since the encryption key is known 
by all parties, it is also known as the public key. In contrast, as the decryption key is only known 
by the owner, it is known as the private key. Although the encryption key is public, it is 
computational infeasible to compute the decryption key from the encryption key. 
Suppose Alice wants to send a message to Bob securely, they only need to have the 
agreement on the algorithms to be used. The details are as follow: 
Let Ek (.) be the encryption process, D" (.) be the corresponding decryption process, and 
M be the plaintext message to be transmitted. Furthermore, let and be the private key 
and public key of Bob respectively. 
1. Alice passes message M as an input to the encryption function 五众(•) with k = yb 
and gets the cipher text C as an output. 
c : E � m 
2. Alice sends the cipher text, C, to Bob over an insecure channel. 
3. When Bob receives the cipher text, C, he performs the decryption process on C with 
his private key to get the message M. 
M = Dxb (C) 
As the speed of asymmetric cryptosystem is slow, it is not used to do bulk data encryption. 
Rather, it is used in the symmetric key exchange. 
Examples of asymmetric cryptosystem include RSA [16] (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman), ECC 
[17，18] (Elliptic Curve Cryptography), and ElGamal public key cryptosystems. 
2.1.3 Digital Signature 
A digital signature is the electronic counterpart of the hand-written signature. It is used in 
the authentication of the signer's document. A digital signature should have the following 
properties [19]: 
1. Authenticity: The recipient is convinced that the signature is deliberately produced by 
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the signer. 
2. Unforgeability: No one other than the signer can produce the same signature as the 
signer does. The signature is a proof of the signer. 
3. Non-reusability: Just like hand-written signature, digital signature should be part of the 
document. No one even the signer can move the signature from one document to 
another different document. 
4. Non-alterability: After the document is signed by the signer, the content of the 
document cannot be changed or else the signature becomes invalid. 
5. Non-repudiation: The signer cannot later deny that he or she has signed such 
document. 
Suppose Alice wants to send a signed message to Bob, she will use her private key to sign 
the document. When Bob receives this document together with the signature, he will use Alice's 
public key to verify the signature. 
Different kinds of digital signature schemes will be discussed in section 2.4. 
2.1.4 Hash Function 
Another name for hash function is message digest. From the name of message digest, the 
output of the hash function is related to the input message, but the size of the output is smaller 
than the input message. 
A hash function is used to produce the fingerprint of the input data. Usually, when a hash 
function is described, it refers to one-way hash function. The word "one-way" means than it is 
easy and fast to transform the message to its digest, but the reverse is not true. More specifically, 
a one-way hash function, H(x), must have the following properties: 
1. H(x) should be applied to any block of data of any size. 
2. H(x) should produce a fixed length output no matter the size of the input data. 
3. H(x) should be easy to compute, given any input x. 
4. H(x) should be a one-way Junction. In other word, given the hash value h of input x, h 
二 H(x)’ it is computationally infeasible to compute back the value ofx, 
5. H(x) should be collision-free. In other word, it is computationally infeasible to find 
another input y, which is different from x, such that their hash value are the same, H(x) 
=H(y), 
The usage of one-way hash function is mainly in the generation of digital signature. The two 
famous hash functions are Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1) [20] and MD-5 [21]. The former 
hashing algorithm produces a 160-bit hash-value while the latter algorithm produces a 128-bit 
output. 
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2.1.5 Digital Certificate 
A digital certificate is a file, which contains user's personal information, his or her public 
key and most importantly, the Certificate Authority's signature. A digital certificate is used in the 
authentication of the identity of a party. 
The Certificate Authority (CA) is a third party that issues digital certificates. Certificate 
Authority usually is a large, famous and trustworthy third party, such as RSA, Verisign, and 
Entrust. 
Suppose you want to send a message to your friend securely, all you need to do is to get 
your friend's digital certificate, use the public key contained in the digital certificate to encrypt 
the message and send to your friend. By using the digital certificate, you can ensure that the party 
whom you send a message is actually the one you want to talk. 
In most e-commerce application, the data being transmitted are required to be in encrypted 
form. To encrypt data by means of public key cryptography, the first thing is to get the public key 
of the receiver side. For simplicity, you can ask the other side to send you its public key. However, 
it is very insecure. First of all, the public key may be substituted by another public key by an 
adversary. Second, the party you talked to may not be an intended one, as its identity hasn't been 
authenticated. Hence, digital certificate is very important in e-commerce application. 
2.1.6 Zero Knowledge Proof 
There are two different types of zero-knowledge proof [ 22, 23 ’ 24 ]，namely 
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, and zero-knowledge proof of membership. 
Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge is a two-parties - the prover and the verifier - protocol 
in which the prover wants to convince the verifier that he "knows" the proof of a given theorem 
without revealing any additional information. 
Zero-knowledge proof of membership is also a two-parties - the prover and the verifier 一 
protocol in which the prover wants to convince the verifier the veridicity of the statement only. 
In the other horizon, zero-knowledge proof can also be classified into an Interactive [24] 
one and Non-interactive [23] one. As a result, there are totally four possible kinds of 
zero-knowledge proof, namely, Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge with Interaction, 
Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge without Interaction, Zero-knowledge proof of membership 
with Interaction, and Zero-knowledge proof of membership without Interaction. 
Among these four kinds of zero-knowledge proof, "Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge 
without Interaction" is very useful in constructing secure cryptographic protocol. 
Zero-knowledge proof can be understood better by considering the following situation. 
Suppose you want to apply a digital certificate from a certificate authority, you need to provide 
your identity information and public key. However, how can the certificate authority know that 
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you really own the corresponding private key? In public key cryptosystem, private key is 
supposedly to be kept securely by the key owner, thereby; you can't just send your private key to 
certificate authority for verification or else the certificate authority can decrypt all your message 
and forge your digital signature. In this scenario, "Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge with 
Interaction" can be employed to convince the certification authority that the applicant has a 
proper corresponding private key without revealing any content in the private key. 
One of famous zero knowledge proof of knowledge is random challenge. Random challenge 
will be discussed in section 2.5. 
2.2 Discrete Logarithm Based Cryptosystem 
In the classification of discrete logarithm based cryptosystems, the securities of those 
cryptosystems are based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [25], which is regarded as a 
computationally infeasible problem. The ElGamal Public Key Encryption Scheme [26] is a 
discrete logarithm based cryptosystem and its security is based on the difficulty of the discrete 
logarithm problem. The ElGamal Public Key Cryptosystem consists of three parts. The first part 
is the preparation stage, also known as setup stage, which is used to generate a pair of ElGamal 
public and private keys. The second and third parts are the ElGamal Encryption Algorithm and 
ElGamal Decryption Algorithm respectively. The basic ElGamal encryption scheme is described 
in the following subsections. 
In section 2.2.1, the ElGamal Public and Private Key Generation Algorithm is reviewed. 
ElGamal Encryption and Decryption Algorithms are reviewed in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 
respectively. 
2.2.1 ElGamal Public and Private Key Generation Algorithm 
Algorithm: ElGamal Key Generation 
SUMMARY: Generation of an ElGamal public and private key pair. 
OUTPUT: ElGamal key pair 0,>0，where x is the private key and :y is the public key. 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Choose a random large prime numbers, p. 
2. Choose a generator g in field Fp. 
3. Generation of Private key a: : Randomly choose x such that 
l<jc< p-2 
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4. Generation of Public key y : 
y 二（P，g,g如odp)) 
After the execution of the above algorithm, an entity gets the ElGamal private key x and 
public key 3； = (p^g.g''). The entity needs to keep the private key secretly and publish the 
public key in some public directories or have the public key certified by some trusted certificate 
authorities. 
2.2.2 ElGamal Encryption Algorithm 
Algorithm: ElGamal Encryption 
SUMMARY: The sender, Alice, uses the ElGamal public key of the recipient, Bob, to encrypt 
the plaintext message m . 
i n p u t ： Defined parameters p and g, plaintext message m，and recipient's public key 
OUTPUT: ElGamal ciphertext, (a, b). 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Alice randomly chooses k which is relatively prime to p -1. 
2. Alice computes the ciphertext (a,b) such that: 
a = g ^  (mod p) 
"二;y�m(mod/?) 
The ElGamal ciphertext (a,b) is then sent to the recipient Bob. It can be sent over an 
insecure channel. 
2.2.3 ElGamal Decryption Algorithm 
Algorithm: ElGamal Decryption 
SUMMARY: The recipient, Bob, uses his ElGamal private key to decrypt ElGamal ciphertext to 
recover the original plaintext message m . 
INPUT: Defined parameters p and g, ElGamal ciphertext, (a,b), and recipient's private 
key X. 
OUTPUT: Plaintext message m . 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Bob computes the original message by the following equation: 
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m = —(mod/?) 
^ 
2.3 Integer Factorization Based Cryptosystem 
In the classification of integer factorization based cryptosystems, the securities of those 
cryptosystems are based on the hardiness of integer factorization problem. The most famous and 
well-known integer factorization based cryptosystem is RSA cryptosystem, which was invented 
by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [16]. 
In RSA public-key cryptography, encryption key consists of two numbers (N, e) which are 
publicly announced while decryption key d is kept secretly by the key holder. This cryptosystem 
is widely used in many E-commerce applications. It consists of three algorithms, which are Public 
and Private Key Generation algorithm, Encryption algorithm, and Decryption algorithm. In this 
section, these algorithms will be reviewed in subsections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3 respectively. 
2.3.1 RSA Public and Private Key Generation algorithm 
Algorithm: RSA Key Generation 
SUMMARY: Generation of a RSA public and private key pair. 
OUTPUT: RSA key pair {(N,eXd}. 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Choose two random large prime numbers, p and q. For maximum security, choose p’ and q 
of the same length. 
2. Compute the product: N = pq 
3. ComputeEuler's totient function: (/)(N) = (p-I) - (q-I). 
4. Randomly choose the encryption key, e, such that e and <p(N) are relative prime and e is 
in between 1 and </>(N) -1. i.e.: 
gcd(G 辦 AO) 二 1 
l<e< (p{N) 
5. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the unique decryption key d, such that: 
ed 三 l(mod 外AO) 
In order words, 
d = e-\mod(j){N)) 
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In the above key generation algorithm, the decryption key d is unique, which is followed 
from the Euclidean Algorithm. { N i s the RSA public key and d is the corresponding RSA 
private key. The two prime numbers, p and q, are no longer needed after this key generation 
process and can be thrown away. 
2.3.2 RSA Encryption Algorithm 
Algorithm: RSA Encryption 
SUMMARY: The sender, Alice, uses the public key of the recipient, Bob, to encrypt the 
plaintext message m. 
INPUT: Plaintext message m , and recipient's public key (N,e). 
OUTPUT: RSA ciphertext, c . 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Alice computes the RSA ciphertext as follow: 
m = (mod AO 
The RSA ciphertext c is then sent to the recipient Bob. It can be sent over an insecure 
channel. 
2.3.3 RSA Decryption Algorithm 
Algorithm: RSA Decryption 
SUMMARY: The recipient, Bob, uses his private key to decrypt RSA ciphertext to recover the 
original plaintext message m . 
INPUT: RSA ciphertext, c，and recipient's private key d . 
OUTPUT: Plaintext message m . 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Bob computes the original message by the following equation: 
•A 
c = me (mod N) 
2.4 Digital Signature 
In paper world, handwritten signatures have been used as a kind of authenticity of and 
authorization of the content of the signed document. Digital Signature is the electronic 
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counterpart of the traditional handwritten signature. 
In 1994, Schneier [27] discussed about the digital authentication and the digital signature. In 
[19], Schneier discussed the five properties that the signature (both handwritten and digital) 
should have. These five properties are: 
1. The signature is authentic. 
The recipient of the signed document should have no doubt that the signed document 
is deliberately signed by the signer. 
2. The signature is unforgeable. 
The signature produced by the signer cannot be deliberately produced by other signers. 
3. The signature is not reusable. 
The signature should be bind in the signed document so that the signature cannot be 
detached and cannot be used in other different document. 
4. The signed document is unalterable. 
When the document is signed, the content of the signed document cannot be modified 
without resigning the document. Or else, the signature becomes invalid. 
5. The signature cannot be repudiated. 
When the signer signs on the document, the signer cannot deny him/her from signing 
such document. 
In real world, the handwritten signature indeed doesn't fulfill all the above five properties. 
For example, the handwritten signature can be forged and the signed document sometimes can be 
modified without producing any noticeable trails. 
2.4.1 RSA based Digital Signature 
The RSA digital signature scheme is essentially identical to the previously described RSA 
Encryption and RSA Decryption algorithm. Before the entity can use the RSA based digital 
signature scheme to sign a document, he/she needs to obtain a pair of RSA public and private key 
by executing the RSA Key Generation Algorithm, which is described in section 2.3.1. 
Suppose an entity, Bob, has the RSA private key d and the corresponding RSA public key 
(7V，d. The signature s on a message m using the private key d is: 
s 二 m" (mod AO 
The validity of the signature s can be verified by any entities. To verify the signature, the 
entity needs to obtain the signer's public key first and check if the following equation is justified. 
If it is not, the signature is faked. 
? 
m = s\modiN) 
The above verification equation works because the RSA public key and RSA private key 
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have the following relation: 
ed 三 l(mod^z)(AO) 
Hence, = m(modN). By comparing the recovered m to the received plaintext 
message m ’ the validity of the signature can be proved. The security of the RSA digital 
signature is based on the difficulty of integer factorization problem. 
2.4.2 ElGamal Digital Signature Scheme 
The ElGamal Digital Signature Scheme was proposed by ElGamal [26] in 1985. It is a 
discrete logarithm based digital signature scheme, and hence the security relies on the difficulty 
of solving discrete logarithm problem in a finite field. 
To sign a document based on ElGamal Digital Signature Scheme, an entity needs to 
generate a pair of ElGamal Public and Private keys first. To generate such pair, the entity needs to 
execute the ElGamal Key Generation, which is described in section 2.2.1. After the entity gets the 
ElGamal key pairs, he/she can execute the following ElGamal Signature Generation Algorithm to 
sign a document. 
Algorithm: ElGamal Signature Generation 
SUMMARY: The signing entity, Alice, signs on the plaintext message m to produce a signed 
document (r, s). 
INPUT: Plaintext message m , and signer's private key x. 
OUTPUT: The signature (r, s). 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Alice randomly chooses a secret integer k such that: 
l<k< p - 2 , a n d gcd(/:，一 1) 二 1 
2. Alice computes r : 
r = g^(modp) 
3. Alice computes: 
s = k—�(h(m) - X. r)(mod(p 一 1)) 
4. The signature for the plaintext message m is (r, s). 
The ElGamal signature (r, s) is publicly verifiable. That means anyone who can get the 
signer's public key ；y = (p，g’ 客""）can verify the validity of the ElGamal signature (r, s). To 
verify the ElGamal signature (r, s)，the entity needs to execute the following ElGamal Signature 
Verification Algorithm. 
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Algorithm: ElGamal Signature Verification 
SUMMARY: The verifier verifies the signer's ElGamal signature by the signer's ElGamal public 
key y = 
INPUT: Defined parameters p and g, the plaintext message m， 
ElGamal signature (r, s), and signer's public key ；y = (p，�g，g”. 
OUTPUT: Boolean result: {Success, Failure}. 
The steps are as follow: 
1. The verifier verifies if 1 < r < p - 1 . If not, reject the signature and return Failure. 
2. The verifier computes v^: 
v^  = y ' ' r^(modp) 
3. The verifier computes h(m) and v�： 
V2 二产 ( m o d p ) 
4. The verifier checks if the following equation holds. If not, reject the signature and return 
Failure. Otherwise, return Success. 
7 
Vi=V2 
The following derivations show how the above signature verification works. Let's start the 
analysis on the equation s = k—�ih(rn) - x. r)(mod(p -1)) . 
s = k—�(him) 一 X. r)(mod(p — 1)) 
k-s = (h(m) - X • r)(mod(p -1)) 
h(m) 二（A:. + . r)(mod(p — 1)) 
产 ) 二 ？ . i m o d p ) 
二 ( n � (力 
二 ；yr. (mod p) 
? 
Hence, by checking whether v, =V2, the validity of ElGamal Signature can be checked. 
2.4.3 Digital Signature Standard 
In [28], National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a standard that 
specifies the use of Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) to generate a digital signature, which is 
used to detect unauthorized modifications to the content of the document and to authenticate the 
identity of the signer. Besides, the generated digital signature fulfills the requirement of 
non-repudiation, which means that the signer cannot deny he/she has produced such signature if 
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he/she actually produced it. 
The DSA digital signature, which is a pair of large numbers, is computed using a set of DSA 
rules and a set of parameters such that the identity of the signatory and integrity of the data can be 
verified [28]. 
Digital Signature Algorithm is a kind of public key cryptography. It consists of three 
components, which are Key Generation, Signature Generation and Signature Verification 
algorithms. Signature Generation algorithm uses the signer's private key to generate the digital 
signature on arbitrary message. Signature Verification uses the signer's corresponding public key 
to verify the validity of the DSA digital signature. In general, each user should keep his/her 
private key in a secure place and the private keys are never shared with other users. The public 
keys are supposed to be known to the whole public, and are usually published in some public 
directories so that anyone can retrieve the signer's public key to perform the signature verification 
process. 
In the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), the signature generation mechanism requires the 
use of a hash function to produce the message digest and feeding the message digest to the Digital 
Signature Algorithm (DSA) to produce the digital signature. NIST explicitly specifies the Secure 
Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) [20] to be used in the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). 
In the following, the Key Generation for DSA, DSA Signature Generation and DSA 
Signature Verification algorithms are reviewed. Note that the DSA algorithms are based on the 
ElGamal Digital Signature Scheme. 
Algorithm: Key Generation for DSA 
SUMMARY: Generation of a DSA public and private key pair. 
OUTPUT: DSA key pair (x, y), where jc is the private key and y is the public key. 
The steps are as follow: 
1 Choose a prime, q, such that . 
2 Choose t so that 0 < r < 8 , and choose a prime, p, such that 25"+� <p< and 
^ I ( P - I ) . 
3 Selection of a generator g of the unique cyclic group of order q in Z*: 
3.1 Choose an element ae Zl and compute g = (mod p). 
3.2 If g =1, go back to step 3.1. 
4 Generation of Private key x by randomly selecting an integer such that l<x<q-l. 
5 Generation of Public key ;y : ；V =(尸，"，<?，p)) 
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Algorithm: DSA Signature Generation 
SUMMARY: The signing entity, Alice, signs on the plaintext message m to produce a signed 
document (r, s). 
INPUT: Plaintext message m，signer's private key x . 
OUTPUT: The signature (r,s). 
The steps are as follow: 
1. The signer, Alice, chooses a random secret integer k such that: 
\<k<q 
2. Alice computes r : 
r = (gk (modp) ) (modq) 
3. Alice computes s : 
s = k—�(h(m) + X. r){modq) 
4. The signature for the plaintext message m is (r,s). 
Algorithm: DSA Signature Verification 
SUMMARY: The verifier verifies the signer's DSA signature by the signer's DSA public key 
INPUT: Defined parameters p, q and g, the plaintext message m , 
DSA signature {r,s) ’ and signer's public key j = . 
OUTPUT: Boolean result: {Success, Failure}. 
The steps are as follow: 
1. The verifier verifies if l < r , 5 < ^ . I f not, reject the signature and return Failure. 
2. The verifier computes w: w = (modg) 
3. The verifier computes h(m), u^ and u�: 
Ml = w' h(m)(modq) 
U2 = r-w{modq) 
4. The verifier computes v: v = (g" '广 (mod p))(mod^) 
5. The verifier checks if the following equation holds. If not, reject the signature and return 
Failure. Otherwise, return Success. 
7 
v = r 
The proof for the DSA Signature Verification process is essentially identical to the proof for 
the ElGamal Signature Verification process. The security of DSA relies on two different discrete 
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logarithm problems (DLP). One is the discrete logarithm problem in a finite field Z*. Another 
one is the discrete logarithm problem in the cyclic subgroup of order q. Solving these two distinct 
kinds discrete logarithm problems are computationally infeasible [29, 30]. 
2.4.4 Shortened Digital Signature Scheme 
In [31], Shortened Digital Signature Scheme was discussed. It is based on the ElGamal 
Digital Signature Scheme [26]. For most ElGamal based digital signature schemes, the storage 
size of the generated signature {r,s) is usually 2|p|, + or 2\q\, where \x\ denotes the 
bit lengths of integer x . The shortened digital signature scheme [31] is the result of reducing the 
storage size of ElGamal based digital signature schemes by using a modified "seventh 
generalization" method, which was discussed in [32]. 
In [31], two shortened digital signature schemes are discussed. Denote them by SDSSl and 
SDSS2. Comparing these two schemes to the ElGamal digital signature scheme, only the 
signature equations on r and s are modified. The key generation part in those two schemes is 
same as that in the ElGamal one. 
For SDSSl, the signature equations on r and s are: r 二modp，m) and 
s = x/{r + x^)modq. The corresponding verification process is changed to firstly calculate 
二（3；“. g r y mod p and check whether the equation hash(k,m) 二 r satisfies. 
For SDSS2, the signature equations on r and s are:厂二/zoy/i(容""modp,m) and 
5 = + • r)mod^. The corresponding verification process is changed to firstly calculate 
k = {g' y/Y mod p and check whether the equation hash{k, m) = r satisfies. 
In the above shortened digital signature schemes, SDSSl and SDSS2, the storage size of the 
generated signature is reduced to \hashi')\ + \q\. Comparing to the Digital Signature Standard 
(DSS) [28], SDSSl and SDSS2 have three advantages: (1) the signature size is smaller, (2) the 
signature verification doesn't require the modular inversion and modular division, and (3) they 
are provably secure in a random oracle model. 
2.4.5 Nyberg-Rueppel Digital Signature Scheme 
The Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme [10，33] is a digital signature scheme based on the 
discrete logarithm problem. The signature generation and verification algorithms are shown 
below: 
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Algorithm: Nyberg-Rueppel Signature Generation [33] 
SUMMARY: To let an entity, Alice, sign on message m such that any entities can verify her 
signature. 
INPUT: A message m, the signer's private key, 
OUTPUT: The signature (r, s). 
The steps are as follow: 
1. The signer, Alice, randomly chooses k such that ke f^  Z^ 
2. The signer, Alice, computes (r,s) as follows: 
r = m. gk (mod p) 
s = x^ 'r + k(modq) 
Algorithm: Nyberg-Rueppel Signature Verification 
SUMMARY: To verify the validity of the signature pair (r,s) for message m’ 
INPUT: A message, m, a signature pair (r, s), the signer's, Alice's, public key, :y“. 
OUTPUT: Boolean validation result: Success or Failure. 
The steps are as follow: 
1. The verifier verifies whether the following equality holds: 
m = g'^y^'rimod p) 
2. If the equality holds, the validation result is Success. Otherwise, it is Failure. 
2.4.6 Schnorr Digital Signature Scheme 
In [34], Schnorr proposed a discrete logarithm based digital signature scheme, which has 
smaller signature size. The size of the schnorr signature is the sum of the size of the output of an 
hash function, which is usually small (160 bits for SHA-1), and the size of security parameter q. 
Although the size of q is smaller than the size of p, the security level will not be reduced [10]. 
The key generation is as same as that of the DSS signature scheme except that there are no 
constraints on the sizes of p and q. The Schnorr Signature Generation and Schnorr Signature 
Verfication are shown as follow: 
Algorithm: Schnorr Signature Generation [34] 
SUMMARY: To let an entity, Alice, sign on message m such that any entities can verify her 
signature. 
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INPUT: A message m, the signer's private key, x^. 
OUTPUT: The signature (s,e). 
The steps are as follow: 
1. The signer, Alice, randomly chooses k such that l<k<q-l 
2. The signer, Alice, computes as follows: 
e = hash{m || g “ (mod p)) and 5 = a'e + k(modq) 
Algorithm: Schnorr Signature Verification [34] 
SUMMARY: To verify the validity of the signature pair (s,e) for message m, 
INPUT: A message, m , a signature pair (s,e), the signer's, Alice's, public key, 
OUTPUT: Boolean validation result: Success or Failure. 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Verify 0 < r, 5 < <7, otherwise, authentication fails. 
2. Compute v 二 and verify if r = hash{m || v). If it is not, reject the 
signature. 
2.5 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange is the public key algorithm proposed by Diffie and Hellman 
[1] to deal with the negotiation problem of session key between two communication parties. 
Particularly, two entities, Alice and Bob, can use Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange algorithm to 
jointly compute their secrete key and use this calculated secret key in subsequent symmetric 
encryption for their secret transmission. 
To compute the common secret key (session key), Alice and Bob firstly choose a random 
integer a and b respectively. Alice computes X = g"(modn) and sends it to Bob. 
Similarly, Bob computes Y = g\modn) and sends it to Alice. Now, these two entities, Alice 
and Bob, can derive the common session key k by computing k = = g"'' (modn) and 
k = X^ = (modn) respectively. 
Note that, by using this algorithm, the communications between two parties need not be in 
secure channel. For the adversary, even he/she gets the values of X and Y，he cannot compute 
the common session key k without knowing either the value of a or Z?. To solve a from 
equation X = g"(modn) or b from equation Y = g''(modn) amounts to a discrete 
logarithm problem, which is regarded as a computationally infeasible problem. 
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2.6 Blind Signature 
In 1983, Chaum [35] introduced a RSA based blinded signature scheme. A blind signature 
scheme [35，36, 37，38] is a useful protocol, which enables an entity to obtain the signature 
from the signer without revealing the content of the document to be signed to the signer. It 
guarantees the anonymity of the participants. It is very useful in constructing Digital Cash 
applications or schemes, such as Electronic Payment System proposed by Camenisch et al. [39， 
40], Secure E-voting protocol [19] and Ferguson's offline electronic coins [41]. 
In this section, blinded version of Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme is reviewed. Section 
2.6.1 discusses the overview of the blinded Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme and section 2.6.2 
reviews the algorithm of the scheme. Discussion on Blind Signature Scheme is in section 2.6.3. 
2.6.1 Overview 
Camenisch, et al. [36] proposed a blinded Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme in which the 
signer does not have a copy of the document it signs. This blind signature scheme is based on the 
discrete logarithm. In [36], a formal definition of the blindness for a signature scheme is given. A 
signature scheme is said to be blind if the signer's complete view of the execution of the protocol 
is statistically independent of the message-signature pair generated in that particular protocol 
execution. 
2.6.2 Blinded Nyberg-Rueppel Digital Signature Scheme 
Blinded Nyberg-Rueppel Signature Scheme [36] was proposed by J. L. Camenisch, J. M. 
Piveteau, and M. A. Stadler. It is a fully blinded signature scheme. The blind signature generation 
is shown below: 
Algorithm: Blinded Nyberg-Rueppel Signature [36] 
SUMMARY: An entity, Alice, blindly signs on message m on request of another entity, Bob. 
INPUT: A message, m，the signer's private key, x^. 
OUTPUT: The signature (r, s). 
The steps are as follow: 
1. The signer, Alice, selects k eZ^, computes 
7 = gk (modp) 
and sends r to Bob. 
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2a) Bob randomly selects (2G Z^ and ^ e Z * , and computes 
r = mg'^r^ (mod p) 
m = (modq) 
2b) Bob checks whether mG Z^*. If this is not the case, he goes back to step 2a. Otherwise, 
he sends m to Alice. 
3. Alice computes 
1 - fhx^ +^(mod q) 
and forwards s to Bob. 
4. Bob computes s by 5 = sP + aimo&q). 
2.6.3 Discussion on Blind Signature Scheme 
Using the above discussed blind signature algorithm, the requesting entity, Bob, can obtain 
an ordinary signature of a signing entity, Alice, on the message m . However, the signing entity, 
Alice, cannot reveal any information on the message m to be signed because it is blinded by the 
blinding factors a and P. Hence, in anonymous electronic cash application, the requester 
(User), Bob, can cheat easily by giving a fake message m (Notes) to the signing entity (Banker), 
Alice, for her signature. To combat this kind of cheating, another technique called cut-and-choose 
protocol [42, 43] is employed to prevent Bob from cheating. 
In this thesis, since the threshold proxy signcryption scheme doesn't require the use of this 
cut-and-choose protocol, this protocol is brief described here for completeness. The mechanism 
of the cut-and-choose protocol is that the requesting entity firstly generates n blinding factors and 
sends n blinded messages to the signing entity. The signing entity requests any n-l blinding 
factors from the requesting entity to un-blind those blinded messages. If the signing entity finds 
the un-blinded messages are valid messages, the signing entity then blindly signs on the last 
remaining blinded message. 
2.7 Threshold Scheme 
In a threshold scheme, such as (threshold) secret sharing [44，45, 46] or threshold signature, 
any combination of t members out of a group of n members can jointly reconstruct the entire 
group secret while any combination of less than t members cannot. 
A secret sharing scheme [9，12] is useful in distributing a cryptography key among a group 
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of people. 
In 1992，threshold cryptosystems were developed by Desmedt and Frankel [47, 48]. 
Threshold digital signature proposed by Ham [49] and Li, et al. [50] enabled a certain number of 
signers to jointly sign a message on behalf of the group. In these threshold schemes, the private 
key was shared among a group of shadow holders in such a way that a threshold number of 
shadow holders can jointly utilize the private key without revealing it. 
In a threshold proxy scheme, the principal avoids giving full delegation to any single proxy. 
Instead, the power is given to n proxy signers and t of them are required to join together before 
they can exercise the full delegated power. 
A Secret Sharing Scheme is a scheme that decomposes a secret into a number of pieces 
which are distributed to different people such that their cooperation are required to recover the 
secret. In the following, two secret sharing schemes are discussed, which are widely used in many 
cryptographic applications. Secret Sharing Scheme is discussed in section 2.7.1 and Pedersen's 
Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme is reviewed in section 2.7.2. 
2.7.1 Secret Sharing Scheme 
The concept of secret sharing was proposed by Shamir and Blakley independently in 1979. 
In [44，45], Shamir and Blakley proposed a way to divide a data into n pieces in such a way 
that any t pieces of them can easily reconstruct the original data and less than t pieces cannot. In 
the proposed scheme, complete knowledge of k pieces, where k<t-l, cannot reveal any 
information about the original data. This secret sharing scheme is useful in constructing threshold 
schemes and threshold applications. 
The Shamir's secret sharing scheme is based on the Lagrange Interpolation polynomial. In a 
two dimensional plane, when given t distinct points, we can construct a unique polynomial f ( x ) 
of degree t - l which satisfies y. = f{x.) for l<i<t . Hence, in order to be able to 
reconstruct the secret from at least t secret shares only, the dealer firstly needs to choose a 
polynomial f{x) of degree r - 1 , with the constant term equals to the secret to be shared. 
Afterward, to find n distinct secret shares, the dealer needs to find n distinct points (x-，兄)，for 
l<i<n , which pass through the generated polynomial f ( x ) . Now, any t points can 
reconstruct the secret easily while less than t points cannot. 
To reconstruct the secret, a unique polynomial f ( x ) with the secret as a constant term is 
recovered from any t secret shares by Lagrange Interpolation polynomial. Thereby, the constant 
term, /(O)，is the reconstructed secret. 
According to [44], the Shamir's secret sharing has several useful properties. Firstly, the size 
of each secret share is smaller than that of the original secret. Secondly, the secret share can be 
dynamically added or removed provided the threshold parameter t is kept fixed. Thirdly, each 
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piece of secret share can be easily changed to other value without changing the original secret or 
data. Lastly, a hierarchical scheme can be formed by using tuples of polynomial values as each 
piece of secret share. In this sense, a more important personnel, say the president of a company, 
will get more information on his/her secret share than his/her colleague, say vice president, will. 
2.7.2 Pedersen's Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme 
Pedersen proposed a {t, n) verifiable secret sharing scheme in 1991 [46], in which the group 
secret generated by all participants can be verified individually. The details are as follow: 
Algorithm: Pedersen Verifiable Secret Sharing [46] 
SUMMARY: For a set of n participants, [P. | l < / < n } , P^ generates a secret share. 
INPUT: The defined parameters p, q’ and g. 
OUTPUT: Secret share, for Participant {P. | l < / < n } . 
1 Each Pi, for 1 < / < n, Pi chooses a random polynomial over Zq of degree t-L 
fi (z) = a.^o + + …+ 以/’卜 iZ 卜 1 (mod q) 
2 Each Pi, for l<i<n, sends /,. ( j ) secretly to Pj, V/ ^ U (1 < 7 < n), and broadcasts 
g“'', for 1< 7 < r - 1 , to all participants in the group. 
3 Each Pi, for 1 < / < n, verifies every 力(/) by checking 
g ' � ) = f t ( ^ y . " ( m o d p ) 
«=o 
4 If all fj{i) are valid, each F, computes s- as its share: 
M 




Introduction to Signcryption 
Encryption can be employed to provide confidentiality. Digital signature [51] can be used to 
provide the authenticity. The two operations can be executed separately, one after another. Or an 
integrated algorithm can be used to carry out both in one shot. These two approaches are 
sometimes called [3] consecutive execution implementation and direct form implementation, 
respectively. The former usually has the advantages of modular design and the utilization of 
well-known component algorithms. The latter usually has the advantages of lower complexity and 
other features. 
Signcryption is a relatively new cryptographic primitive, which is a direct form 
implementation of both symmetric encryption and digital signature. It fulfills both authentication 
and confidentiality simultaneously in a logically single step and provides lower computation cost 
and communication overhead than "Signature-then-Encryption" scheme. 
Proxy signcryption scheme is a variant of digital signcryption scheme. It enables a principal 
to delegate its authority in producing signcryption to a trusted proxy agent. Proxy signcryption 
can be used to address the problem of insufficient hardware resources to perform the digital 
signcryption process. 
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the notations for some commonly used public parameters 
follow the definition defined in Table 1. 
In this chapter, section 3.1 discusses some traditional "Signature-then-Encryption" Scheme 
which can achieve both the authenticity and confidentiality on the message. Zheng's Digital 
Signcryption Scheme is introduced in section 3.2. In section 3.3，a proxy signcryption scheme is 
introduced. An improved signcryption scheme is included in section 3.4. 
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Table 1: 




1 p A large prime number. 
2 q A prime number which divides p -1. 
3 g An element of order q in the multiplicative group Z; 
4 Eli • ) A symmetric encryption algorithm with private key k. 
5 Dil • ) A symmetric decryption algorithm with private key k. 
6 Hil • ) A secure keyed hash function with key k. 
7 (X，;yJ (Xu’yj is defined as a private and public key pair for user, u, 
where the private key 乂“ e z / and jcJ (/? -1)，and the public key 
= mod p. 
3.1 Traditional "Signature-then-Encryption'' Scheme 
Traditional "Signature-then-Encryption" Scheme obviously is a consecutive execution 
approach to achieve both the confidentiality and authenticity on the given message. In this section, 
three different "Signature-then-Encryption" schemes are discussed. Firstly, 
Signature-then-Encryption based on RSA is reviewed in section 3.1.1. Signature-then-Encryption 
based on DSS + ElGamal Encryption is reviewed in section 3.1.2. Finally, 
Signature-then-Encryption based on Schnorr signature + ElGamal encryption is reviewed in 
section 3.1.3. 
3.1.1 Signature-then-Encryption based on RSA 
To achieve both confidentiality and authenticity by traditional RSA approach, the signer first 
produces a RSA signature s on the message m to be signed and uses the recipient's RSA 
public key to encrypt the message and signature pair (m, s). Hence, it can be viewed as a 
consecutive execution of RSA digital signature scheme and symmetric cipher scheme followed by 
RSA public key encryption scheme. 
Suppose Alice and Bob have their RSA key pairs and Cx",(;y"，n")) 
respectively. If Alice wants to send the authenticated and secure message m to Bob, she 
executes the following steps: 
1. Randomly choose a session key, k, and encrypt the message m by symmetric cipher, 
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e.g. DES, IDEA, c = E,^ (m). 
2. Compute r = A : ( m o d n J and 5 = {hash{M)Y'' ( m o d n j . 
3. Send (c, r, s) to Bob. 
When Bob receives (c, r, s) from Alice, he executes the following steps to decrypt and 
verify the signature of the decrypted message m . 
1. Compute the session key k = r 乂' (mod n办). 
2. Decrypt m by m = D^ (c). 
3. Check whether hash{m) = s^" (mod n^) .If not, reject the received (c’ r, s). 
Under this approach, the computation cost for Alice and Bob are both two exponentiations 
and one symmetric cipher encryption while the whole communication size is \na\ + \nb\ + \m\, 
where |x| is the bit length of the bit string ；c. Compared to the communication without any 
encryption and authentication employed, to send the message m from Alice to Bob, \m\ bits 
communication size is needed. Hence, the communication overhead for this approach is 丨nj + \ni\. 
3.1.2 Signature-then-Encryption based on DSS + ElGamal Encryption 
In previous section, RSA signature and RSA public key encryption schemes are used. Those 
schemes have one main drawback. The drawback is that the output sizes of both schemes are 
relatively large. Suppose + \nb\ = 1024, the communication overhead of the RSA approach is 
2048 bits. On the other hand, the output sizes of DSS and ElGamal Encryption schemes are 
relatively small. In this section, these schemes will be used to construct the 
"Signature-then-Encryption" scheme. 
Another consecutive execution approach is to use DSS signature standard and symmetric 
cipher on the message m first, and followed by the ElGamal public key encryption scheme on 
the resultant message signature pair (m, s). In this approach, the mechanism is based on discrete 
logarithm rather than on integer factorization as in the RSA approach in the section 3.1.1. 
To start with, Alice and Bob need to have a pair of DSS/ElGamal public and private key 
pairs. They are also known as Discrete Logarithm (DL) key pairs and can be generated by the 
DSA Key Generation algorithm in section 2.4.3. Suppose Alice with DL key pair (x^，;=<?""�） 
wants to send a secure and authenticated message to Bob, who has DL key pair (x^,y^ = g ” , 
she executes the following steps: 
1. Choose a random secret integer ； where 0<k'<q，and compute 
/ fcv J � � / J � J hash(jn) + Xa.r r = (gk (modp))(modq) and s = (modg). 
K 
2. Randomly choose a session key, k, and encrypt the message m by symmetric cipher, 
e.g. DES, IDEA, c = E^{m). 
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3. Randomly choose an integer /, where ! < / < « - ! , and compute 厂=容'（mod/?) and 
S = k'yj(modp). 
4. Alice sends (c, r，5, S) to Bob. 
When Bob receives from Alice, he executes the following steps to decrypt 
and verify the signature of the decrypted message m. 
1. Compute symmetric cipher key, k = ). < )^(mod p)，and decrypt the message by 
m = Dk (c) • 
2. Perform the DSS signature verification algorithm, which is discussed in section 2.4.3. 
In this approach, the computation cost for Alice and Bob are three exponentiations, one hash 
function calculation and one symmetric cipher encryption while the whole communication size is 
2.|(?| + 2.|p| + |m|，where is the bit length of the bit string x . Compared to the 
communication without any encryption and authentication employed, to send the message m 
from Alice to Bob, |m| bits communication size is needed. Hence, the communication overhead 
for this approach is 2-{q + p). 
3.1.3 Signature-then-Encryption based on Schnorr signature + 
ElGamal encryption 
In section 2.4.6, Schnorr signature scheme is reviewed. The advantage of that signature 
scheme is that the signature size is reduced at no expense of losing security level. In this section, 
Schnorr signature scheme is employed to construct the "Signature-then-Encryption" scheme. 
This consecutive execution approach utilizes the Schnorr signature scheme and ElGamal 
public key encryption scheme to provide both authenticity and confidentiality. To begin with, 
Alice and Bob need to have a pair of Schnorr public and private key pairs, which are also known 
as Discrete Logarithm (DL) key pairs and can be generated by the DSA Key Generation 
algorithm in section 2.4.3. Suppose Alice with DL key pair (x^^y^ = g"") wants to send a 
secure and authenticated message to Bob, who has DL key pair = g""')^ she executes the 
following steps: 
1. Randomly choose a session key, k, and encrypt the message m by symmetric cipher, 
e.g. DES, IDEA, c = E,im). 
2. Generate the Schnorr signature on message m to get Schnorr signature (s,e). 
3. Perform the ElGamal Encryption on message m to get . 
4. Alice sends {c,s,e,y, S) to Bob. 
When Bob receives {c,r,s,r,S) from Alice, he executes the following steps to decrypt 
and verify the signature of the decrypted message m. 
1. Compute symmetric cipher key, k = ((/'"')'S)(modn), and decrypt the message by 
m = Dk (c). 
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2. Perform the Schnorr signature verification algorithm, which is discussed in section 2.4.6. 
In this approach, the computation cost for Alice and Bob are three exponentiations, one hash 
function calculation and one symmetric cipher encryption while the whole communication size is 
hasJi q +2' p + m . Hence, the communication overhead for this approach is 
hash q +2- p , 
3.2 Zheng's Digital Signcryption Scheme 
In 1997’ Y. Zheng proposed a digital signcryption scheme [2], which was a direct form 
implementation of both symmetric encryption and digital signature. In addition to lower 
complexity than consecutive execution approaches, it has the following benefits: 
• Ephemeral symmetric cipher key - In contrast to the Diffie-Hellman secret value 
derivation algorithm where the secret value (i.e. the symmetric cipher key) is fixed once 
the public key pairs of the sender and the receiver are fixed, the symmetric cipher key 
used in Zheng's signcryption is altered for each signcryption session. 
• Designated verifier - Only the intended verifier can confirm the signature in the 
signcryption. 
Zheng's digital signcryption scheme is a cryptographic method that fulfills both the 
functions of secure encryption and digital signature, in direct form implementation. 
Algorithm: Signcryption [2] 
SUMMARY: Alice, the sender, generates a signcryption for the plaintext message m. 
INPUT: The plaintext m, Alice's private key , and Bob's public key y^. 
OUTPUT: A signcryption (c, r, s). 
The steps are as follows: 
1 • Randomly choose jc, where 1< 
2. Compute k = yj mod p. 
3. Split k into k^ and k^. 
4. Compute r = (m). 
X 
5. Compute s = mod q . 
6. Compute c - E�(m). 
In the unsigncryption algorithm, it takes the signcrypted text (c, r, s)，Alice's public key 
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y^ and Bob's private key x,，as inputs. It then uses ;y“，jc ,^ r, and s to recover the 
ephemeral key which is useful in the symmetric decryption and the authentication of the message 
m. If the authentication is valid, the original message m will be outputted. 
Algorithm: Unsigncryption [2] 
SUMMARY: Bob, the receiver, recovers the encryption key, recovers the plaintext, and checks 
the signature from the received signcryption (c, r, s). 
INPUT: Bob's private key x^, Alice's public key , and the signcryption (c, r,s). 
OUTPUT: Message m. 
The steps are as follows: 
1. Recover k from k = {y^ - g'T'' mod p. 
2. Split k into k�and k:. 
3. m = D^ (c). 
4. Verify whether r = H^ (m). If it is the case, accept the signcrypted text (c, r, s) is from 
the sender, Alice. 
In the unsigncryption algorithm, only the intended receiver, Bob, can unsigncrypt the 
signcrypted text (c, r,s) as the recovery of symmetric decryption key, k ’ requires the 
knowledge of receiver's private key, x^. 
The security of the digital signcryption is based on the security of discrete logarithm 
problem, as the recovery of k is a DLR 
3.3 Proxy Signcryption Scheme 
Proxy signcryption scheme was proposed by Gamage, et al. in 1999 [5]. It enables a 
principal to delegate its authority in producing signcryption to a trusted proxy agent. Proxy 
signcryption can be used to address the problem of insufficient hardware resources to perform the 
digital signcryption process. 
In [5], the proposed proxy signcryption scheme was consisted of three components, which 
were Setup, Sign and Verify Algorithms. The details of these three algorithms are as follow. 
Algorithm: Setup [5] 
SUMMARY: Alice, the sender, creates the proxy secret ( x 叩 a n d securely transmits it to 
the trusted proxy agent. 
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INPUT: Defined public parameters, p’ q, g, and Alice's private key jc�. 
OUTPUT: A proxy secret (x叩,K). 
The steps are as follows: 
1. Randomly choose ;c, where l<x< q-l. 
2. Compute K = g ‘‘ (mod p). 
3. Compute proxy private key: 
X 叩+xK(modp-l) 
4. Compute proxy public key: 
= (mod p) 
After the execution of the above Setup algorithm, the proxy agent gets the proxy share 
(X叩，K) and y^ is the corresponding proxy public key of proxy private key x叩.When the 
proxy agent need to produce a signcryption on message m on behalf of the original principal, 
Alice, the proxy agent executes the following Proxy Signcryption Algorithm to produce the proxy 
signcrypted text (c, r, 5, K). 
Algorithm: Proxy Signcryption [5] 
SUMMARY: The proxy agent produces a proxy signcrypted text on a plaintext message m on 
behalf of the original principal. 
INPUT: The plaintext m, Alice's private key j：^, and Bob's public key 
OUTPUT: A proxy signcryption (c, r,s,K). 
The steps are as follows: 
1. Execute the Zheng's digital signcryption scheme and obtain (c, r, s). 
2. Append K to form the proxy signcrypted text (c, r, s, K). 
When Bob receives the proxy signcrypted text {c,r,s,K) from Alice, he executes 
following proxy un signcryption algorithm to recover and authenticate the original message. 
Algorithm: Proxy Un signcryption [5] 
SUMMARY: Bob, the receiver, recovers the proxy public key, recovers the encryption key, 
recovers the plaintext, and checks the signature from the received proxy 
signcryption (c, r, s, K). 
INPUT: Bob's private key ，Alice's public key ，and the proxy signcryption 
(c, r,s,K). 
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OUTPUT: Message m. 
The steps are as follows: 
1. Recovery of proxy public key: y叩=y^ . K ^  (mod p) 
2. Execute the Zheng's unsigncryption algorithm. 
3.4 Improved Digital Signcryption Scheme 
Chung et al. [52] identified some defeats of Zheng's original digital signcryption and 
proposed some new improved signcryption schemes. In this section, some defeats of Zheng's 
original digital signcryption are discussed first and followed by a review of a division-less 
improved signcryption scheme. 
In Zheng's original digital signcryption, the signcryption process needs to calculate s ’ 
where 5 = ;c/(r + jcJCmodg). Calculating s is possible only if the inverse of r + , i.e. 
{r + xJ'\modq)，exists. Hence, Zheng's original digital signcryption scheme requires 
r ^ -x^ (mod (7). Otherwise, r + x�=0(mod<7) and r + x^ has no inverse. In this case, the 
whole signcryption process should be repeated to change the value of r . This will incur an extra 
modulo exponentiation, and the advantage of pre-calculation of ； i s lost. Secondly, the 
original Zheng's original digital signcryption scheme requires a modulus division in the 
calculation of s . Calculation of modulus division increases the size of hardware and processing 
time and hence it is not desirable. Actually, it is just a disadvantage and not a defeat. 
Algorithm: Improved Signcryption 
SUMMARY: It is an algorithm run by the sender to generate a signcrypted text on the input 
message m. 
INPUT: Message, m, sender (Alice)'s private key, x^ ， 
receiver (Bob)'s public key, y^，public parameters defined in Table 1. 
OUTPUT: A signcrypted text, (c, r, s). 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Randomly choose jc，where i< x< q-I. 
2. Compute A: = (mod p). 
3. Compute symmetric encryption key, k^ from k : k^ = 
4. Compute the hash function key, k^ from k : k^ 
5. Compute r = H(m). 
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6. Compute s = x-\- x^ • r - r(modq). 
7. Compute c = (m). 
After computing c, r, and 5, the sender, Alice, can send the signcrypted text, (c, r, s)，to the 
receiver, Bob. The signcrypted text can only be unsigncrypted by the intended receiver, Bob. 
When the receiver, Bob, receives the signcrypted text, (c, r, s), he can execute the following 
unsigncryption algorithm to check the authenticity of and recover the plaintext message. 
Algorithm: Improved Un signcryption 
SUMMARY: It is an algorithm run by the receiver to check the authenticity of the message and 
recover the plaintext message from the encrypted form. 
INPUT: Signcrypted text, (c, r, s), receiver (Bob)'s private key, x办. 
sender (Alice)'s public key, y^, public parameters defined in Table 1. 
OUTPUT: If the message can be authenticated, plaintext message m is outputted. 
Otherwise, NULL message is outputted. 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Recovery of k: k = (mod p) 
2. Compute symmetric encryption key, k�from k : k^ (k) 
3. Compute the hash function key, k^ from k :众2 二�//(众） 
4. Recovery of plaintext message, m: m = D^  (c) 
？ 
5. Validate the following equality: (m) 
6. If the equality is hold, m is outputted. Otherwise, NULL is outputted. 
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Chapter 4 
A Threshold Signcryption Scheme 
In this chapter, two new threshold signcryption schemes are presented. The threshold 
signcryption scheme is to let more than one participant to produce a valid signcryption. 
Specifically, two threshold signcryption schemes are presented in this chapter. One is a general 
scheme and the other one is a specific case of the former with improved complexity, which are 
known as (广，n) and (n, «)-threshold signcryption schemes respectively. 
In (r, «)-threshold signcryption scheme, the participation of t members out of a group of n 
members are required to produce the signcryption on behalf of the whole group. 
In (n, n)-threshold signcryption scheme, the participation of all members in a group of n 
members are required to produce the signcryption on behalf of the whole group. As all members 
in the group are called in participation, it is also known as group signcryption. In this sense, (r, 
n)-threshold signcryption scheme is a general threshold signcryption scheme, while («， 
«)-threshold signcryption scheme is its specific case. In the case of r = there are some 
techniques to reduce the complexity of protocol. A (n, w)-threshold signcryption scheme with 
improved complexity is also presented in this chapter. 
In this chapter, the organization is as follows. A {t, «)-thresh old signcryption scheme will be 
introduced in section 4.1. In section 4.2，a («，n)-threshold signcryption scheme with improved 
complexity will be introduced. 
4.1 A (t，w)-Threshold Signcryption Scheme 
The aim of {t, n)-threshold signcryption scheme is to let t or more members in a group of n 
members to produce a signcryption on behalf of the whole group. In the process, it employs the 
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technique that can generate a group secret (group private key) and distribute this secret among the 
group members in a secure way, Thereby, t or more members in the group can utilize the group 
secret to carry out the signcryption process, while each member doesn't know the group secret. 
4.1.1 Scheme Description 
In the (t, n)-threshold signcryption scheme, it consists of 2 stages. The first stage is a 
preparation stage, while the second one is the actual signcryption and unsigncryption stage. 
Unless otherwise explicitly specified, we assume that (x^, y^  = g ' ' ) and (x办，:y办=8'') 
are the discrete-logarithm key pairs of Alice and Bob, respectively. 
In this subsection, a (r, n)-threshold signcryption scheme is presented. It is defined by a 
triplet , ；5CA, USCA), where "^KG— is a (U «)-threshold key generation with trusted 
party protocol, "SCA is a (t, n)-threshold signcryption algorithm and USCA is the 
corresponding unsigncryption algorithm. 
In the preparation stage, it involves n + l parties, including all members in the group and the 
trusted party. In this stage, the trusted party generates the group private key and the corresponding 
secret shares by (f, n) secret sharing technique. These secret shares are then distributed to the n 
designated signers. The algorithm is as follows: 
Algorithm: (r, n) Threshold Group Key Generation with Trusted Party (l^ /iTG"^ 尸) 
SUMMARY: In this algorithm, the trusted party is responsible in generating a group secret 
(group private key) jc^  and uses 0，n) secret sharing technique to divide it into n 
distinct pieces x- such that t of the shares can jointly recover the group secret. 
The trusted party then distributes these n secret shares to n shareholders Pi. 
INPUT: Defined public parameters, p, q, g. 
OUTPUT: For each signer Pi, ieU, the unique signer's ID and the group secret share, 
The group public key . 
The steps are as follow: 
1 Generation of signer's ID 
1.1 The trusted party generates n unique number in Z^ such that the signer's ID 
belongs to the set U : 
U = {«,. I e Z�& i, j G Z„_i & Ui 本 Uj & i * ;} 
1.2 The trusted party then sends the signer's ID to « signers. 
2 Generation of group's key pair. 
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2.1 The trusted party randomly generates group's private key such that 
^g^RK 
and Xg | ( /?-1). 
2.2 The trusted party computes group's public key: 
Yc =客 (mod p) 
3 The trusted party chooses a random polynomial over Z" of degree t - 1 such that the 
constant term is group private key, ； . Denote this polynomial by / ( z ) . 
f(z) = Xc + + a 卜1 z 卜1 (mod q), 
where a. e Z^, and 
= m � 
4 The trusted party broadcasts the group public key ；y^  to all signers in the group, 
publishes it in a public directory and has it certified by a CA. 
jc (modp) (2) 
5 For each signer ieU , the trusted party sends x- to 尸,secretly, where 
x,=f(i)(modq) (3) 
6 The trusted party broadcasts g"' , for 1< ; < r - l , t o all signers in the group. 
7 Now, each signer ieU , receives x., and l<j<t-l. Each P, verifies the 
validity of every x. by the following steps. 
7.1 Pi verifies 
n=l 
where is the public key of the group. 
7.2 If the verification fails, P/ broadcasts x. and rejects x. 
7.3 If none of x. are rejected, the verification completes. Otherwise, the process stops. 
8 Each Pi keeps x. in a secret place 
After the above algorithm, each signer, P„ ieU , has the secret share of the group private 
key, which can be used in the following (t, n) threshold signcryption algorithm to jointly produce 
the signcryption with other members. 
In the second stage, it involves t + 1 entities, including any t members in a group of n 
members and the designated receiver. 
In the threshold signcryption, the participating proxy signers use their proxy shares to 
recover the group private key and do the normal signcryption without revealing the group private 
key. The signers then send out the signcrypted text to the receiver. The algorithm is based on the 
38 
improved signcryption scheme [52]. The (t，n)-Threshold Signcryption is in the following. 
Algorithm: (t, «)-Threshold Signcryption 
SUMMARY: The threshold signcryption algorithm requires at least t signers' participation so as 
to signcrypt the message. If more than t signers, choose t of them randomly. Let 
L? bea set containing all the ID of participating signers. 
INPUT: Defined public parameters p, q, g, 
Each participating signer's secret share (i,x.) for all ie U , 
Receiver's public key ，and 
The message m. 
OUTPUT: ASigncryptedText (c, r,s). 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Each Pi, ieU , with secret share (/,x.), computes 
t. =c.x. (5) 
where c. = n y ^ (6) 
led 
2. Each Pi, ieU, randomly generates n. such that n. e Z* 
3. Each Pi, ieU , computes 
= mod p (7) 
4. Each Pi, ieU , broadcasts ei to all Pj jeU\ {/}. 
5. Each Pi, ieU , computes 
e = Y \ e j modp (8) 
mO 
6. Each Pi, ieU, computes 
r = / / � " ( > ) (9) 
5,. + -rVmod<7 (10) 
c = E.e �(m) (11) 
7. Each Pi, ieU, broadcasts Si to all signers 
8. Each Pi, ieU, computes 
s = (12) 
j^u 
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The triplet (c, r, s) is the signcrypted text and it is sent to the receiver, Bob. 
In the receiver side, the receiver firstly gets the group public key from the public directory 
and authenticates it with the trusted CA. The receiver then does the normal unsigncryption. The 
Unsigncryption algorithm is as follow: 
Algorithm: Unsigncryption (USCA) 
SUMMARY: To verify the authenticity of and recovers the plaintext m from signcrypted text. 
INPUT: Defined public parameters p，q, g. 
Received Signcrypted Text (c, r, 5), 
Group public key y^，and 
The designated receiver's private key x^. 
OUTPUT: Original Plaintext m. 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Recovery of message encryption key, e. 
e = -ya"y mod p (13) 
2. Decryption of cipher text: 
m = Z)r"�（c) (14) 
3. Verification of authentication: The receiver, Bob, checks whether the following equation 
is satisfied. 
� ( m ) (15) 
In view of modular system design, the proposed (t, n) threshold signcryption scheme can be 
viewed ；5CA, USCA) algorithms combination. 
The above proposed {t, n) threshold signcryption scheme has assumed the existence of the 
trustworthy party to prepare the group secret and the corresponding secret share. In Chapter 6’ a 
new (r, n) threshold signcryption scheme will be proposed in which this assumption is removed. 
4.1.2 Validity Analysis 
To prove the correctness of the {t, n) threshold signcryption scheme, we need to show that (1) 
given a valid signcrypted text (c, r, s)，the unsigncryption algorithm can recover the message m 
and check its authenticity in the sense that no one, including the trusted party, all signers, and the 
receiver, cheat, and (2) at least t members out of a group of n members are required to jointly 
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produce a valid signcrypted text. 
Theorem 1 (Validity of "SCA and USCA algorithm pair): For any arbitrary message m 
passed to the {t, n) threshold signcryption algorithm "5CA, a signcrypted text {c,r,s) is 
produced such that the corresponding unsigncryption algorithm USCA can recover the original 
message m and can check the authenticity of the received signcrypted text (c, r, s), provided 
that: 
1. No signer cheat, 
2. No recipient cheat, 
3. The group secret key can be reconstructed by Lagrange Interpolation Polynomial 
Formula f{x) from t secret shares such that x^ = /(O)， 
4. The group public key used in the unsigncryption algorithm is the DL public key of ’ 
i.e. J g = • 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
Given a valid signcrypted text (c,r,5) and valid group public key , it suffices to show 
that the recovered ephemeral key e in Eq. (13) of unsigncryption algorithm is the same 
ephemeral key e as in Eq. (8) of the (t, n) threshold signcryption algorithm. Denote the 
recovered ephemeral key by e'. 
Before we prove e'=e, we find the relation between the signcrypted text (c, r, s)，and the 
group private key . 
Without loss of generosity, assume the t secret shares used in the (t’ n) threshold 
signcryption algorithm are (w,，), u^eU . From these t points, we can construct a polynomial, 
f(z) ’ of degree r - 1 by Lagrange Interpolation Polynomial Formula. 
/ � = t L “ z K (16) 
r=l 
where 
[0, for z^ 丰 Uf 
= ( z - “ 2 ) . . . (广“卜 i X广" r + i )"•("“,） 
I=T - O 
m关r 
From Eq. (1)，x^ = /(O)，and hence, by Eq. (19)，we have: 
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jeO led t 一 （ 
I 对 (17) 
jeU l€U ^ ( M 
In the 0，n) threshold signcryption algorithm, the value of s computed by Eq. (12) by t 
signers is: 
广 &御 o d g ) 
MU 
f \ 
= + � - r V (modg) 
kj^g ) 
= + 1 > 厂 Z r V ) ( m o d ^ ) (18) 
jeU jeU jeU 
=(么 rt 又)+ 2 >厂 2>�)(mod … 
jeU leO I 一 I jeU jeU 
= “r)(modq) 
jeU 
As a result, provided that t members in a group of n members do not cheat, they produce the 
following signcrypted text: 
c = � (劝 （19) 
r = (20) 
5 = (r • jCQ + . - r)(mod q) (21) 
j^u 
In the receiver side, the recipient will use the values of r and s in Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) 
to recover the ephemeral key . We now prove that e by considering Eq. (13). 
？ 广 ( m o d p ) 
二（广 " • ( � ' � ) " ) � ( m o d p ) 
r-Xo^  2： ttj 
為〜(modp) (22) 





As e'=e, the keys for the symmetric encryption and keyed hash function of the (r, n) 
threshold signcryption algorithm and unsigncryption algorithm are the same. Therefore, the 
message m can be recovered and the authenticity of the message can be validated. This 
completes the proof for theorem 1. 
The second criteria for correctness - at least t members out of a group of n members 
are required to jointly produce a valid signcrypted text - is a direct consequence of {t, n) 
secret sharing technique property. 
Thereby, the correctness of the {U n) threshold signcryption scheme is proved. 
4,1.3 Security Analysis 
Assume the underlying signcryption and unsigncryption algorithms of the (/，n) threshold 
signcryption scheme are secure which have been proved in [7，9], the security issue of the 
signcryption scheme becomes the forgeability problem. 
Theorem 2 (Unforgeability of ；5CA and USCA algorithm pair): The {u n) threshold 
signcryption algorithm ；5CA and unsigncryption algorithm USCA pairs are secure against 
forgery attack if the number of colluding members is less than the threshold parameter t. 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
To prove theorem 2, we firstly consider how the signcrypted text can be forged and 
subsequently show that it is infeasible. We will consider this issue in two perspectives, one is 
from the designated signers and another one is from the outsider. 
For the outsider, his/her adversarial view contains g , p, q , “，and y^ . To forge a 
valid signcrypted text, he/she needs to get the group private key x � b y solving the following 
equation: 
y^ = g'^ (mod p) (23) 
Solving Eq. (23) is a discrete logarithm problem, which is computationally infeasible. As a 
result, no outsider can forge a valid signcrypted text on behalf of the designated group. 
From the perspective of the signers, it is obvious that it is infeasible to reconstruct the group 
secret (private key), if less than t secret shares are collected, which is a direct consequence of (J, n) 
secret sharing technique property. 
Thus, ("SCA - USCA) pair is secure against forgery attack and theorem 2 is proved. 
Given the assumption that the key generation party is trusted and the result of theorem 2，the 
proposed (t’ n) threshold signcryption scheme is secure against forgeability attack. 
To conclude, the security of our proposed threshold proxy signcryption scheme relies on the 
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difficulties of solving the discrete logarithm problem. Although the size of q is less than that ofp, 
the security doesn't loosen. Generally speaking, to crack the general discrete logarithm problem 
发"（modp)，to the author's best knowledge, the algorithm proposed by Dan Shanks and John 
Pollard [53] still needs q^'^ operations which involving multiplication modulo p. For example: 
suppose q is 160 bits long integer and p is 1024 bits long, solving the discrete logarithm problem 
with such security parameters at least take lO�* Mips-Year on a general purpose computer. 
« 
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4.2 A (w，w)-Threshold Signcryption Scheme with 
Improved Complexity 
A (n, n) threshold signcryption scheme requires the collaboration of all participants in a 
group of size n to produce the signcryption for the whole group. Thereby, it is also known as 
group signcryption scheme. 
In the {n, n) threshold signcryption scheme, the complexity can be improved because there 
is no need to employ the {t, n) secret sharing technique in both group key generation and 
signcryption algorithm, as all members in a group are required to participate. 
4.2.1 Scheme Description 
In the (n, n)-threshold signcryption scheme, it consists of 2 stages. The first stage is a 
preparation stage, while the second one is the actual signcryption and un signcryption stage. 
In this subsection, a (n, «)-threshold signcryption scheme is presented. It is defined by a 
triplet "SCA, USCA). "ATG聊 is a (n, n)-threshold key generation with trusted party 
protocol. "SCA is a (n, «)-threshold signcryption algorithm and USCA is the corresponding 
unsigncryption algorithm. 
In the preparation stage, it involves n+l parties, including all members in the group and the 
trusted party. In this stage, the trusted party generates the group private key and the corresponding 
secret shares by simple modular addition technique. These secret shares are then distributed to the 
n designated signers. The algorithm is as follows: 
Protocol: («，n) Threshold Group Key Generation with Trusted Party KG打^) 
SUMMARY: In this algorithm, the trusted party is responsible in generating a group secret 
(group private key) x � a n d randomly choosing n distinct pieces of secret shares 
X, such that the summation of n secret shares equals to group private key, i.e. 
n-\ 
jCg = ^x.(modq). The trusted party then distributes these n secret shares to n 
1=0 
shareholders Pi. 
INPUT: Defined public parameters, p，q, g. 
OUTPUT: For each signer P/, ieU, the unique signer's ID and the group secret share, 
( / , X.)，and 
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The group public key y^. 
The steps are as follow: 
1 Generation of signer's ID: 
1.1 The trusted party generates n unique number in Z^ such that the signer's ID 
belongs to the set U : 
1.2 The trusted party then sends the signer's ID ton signers. 
2 Generation of group's key pair. 
2.1 The trusted party randomly generates group's private key such that 
and Xc l O - l ) . 
2.2 The trusted party computes group's public key: 
yc �（mod/7) 
3 Generation of secret shares. 




3.2 For each signer / e C/, the trusted party sends x. to P, secretly. 
In the above protocol, simplest secret sharing technique is employed. In step 3.1, the n 
secret shares can be generated by firstly randomly choosing n-\ secret shares, ， • x � ， . ， 
and computing the last secret share by subtracting first n - 1 secret shares from the group 
private key jc^. If the calculated x^ is same as one of the first n - 1 secret shares, all n secret 
shares are abandoned and this process is re-run again until all n secret shares are distinct. 
The second stage of the threshold proxy signcryption scheme consists of the following 
threshold signcryption and unsigncryption algorithms. 
As same as (t, n) threshold signcryption scheme, the signcryption and unsigncryption 
algorithms of the (n, n) threshold signcryption scheme are based on the improved signcryption 
scheme [52]. However, they are also the n + 1 parties algorithms. The details of (n, n) threshold 
signcryption are as follow: 
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Algorithm: (/i, n) Threshold Signcryption ("SCA) 
SUMMARY: The (n, n) threshold signcryption algorithm requires all signers' participation so as 
to signcrypted the message. 
INPUT: Defined public parameters p, q, g, 
Each participant's secret share, (/，jc,) for all ieU, such that the group private 




Receiver's public key ，and 
The message m. 
OUTPUT: A Signcrypted Text (c, r,s). 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Each signer ieU , randomly generates n,. such that n. G Z* 
2. Each signer Pi, ieU , computes 
e,. = y广(mod p) (25) 
3. Each Pi, ieU , broadcasts e. to all signers. 
4. Each signer Pi’ ieU , computes 
e = ] ^ e � o d p ) (26) 
5. Each signer Pi, ieU , computes 
r = (27) 
s. = jc,.r + n. 一 n~^r(modq) (28) 
c = � , ) ( m ) (29) 
6. Each Pi, ieU , broadcasts s. to all signers 
7. Each signer P„ ie U, computes 
5 = ^5 . (mod^) (30) 
jeU 
The triplet (c, r, s) is the group signcrypted text and it is sent to the receiver, Bob. 
When Bob receives the signcrypted text (c, r,s), he does the unsigncryption algorithm 
use A，which is defined in subsection 4.1.1, to authenticate and decrypt the message m . 
In view of modular system design, the proposed (t, n) threshold signcryption scheme can be 
viewed as C U S C A ) algorithms combination. 
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4.2.2 Validity Analysis 
As same as (t’ n) threshold signcryption scheme, the correctness of the (n, n) threshold 
signcryption scheme can be proved by showing that (1) given a valid signcrypted text (c, 
the unsigncryption algorithm can recover the message m and check its authenticity in the sense 
that no one, including the trusted party, all signers, and the receiver, cheat and (2) all n members' 
participation are required to jointly produce a valid signcrypted text. 
Theorem 3 (Validity of "SCA and USCA algorithm pair): For any arbitrary message m 
passed to the complexity improved (n, n) threshold signcryption algorithm "5CA, a signcrypted 
text (c, r,5) is produced such that the corresponding unsigncryption algorithm USCA can 
recover the original message m and can check the authenticity of the received signcrypted text 
(c, r, s)，provide that: 
1. No signer cheat, 
2. No recipient cheat, 
3. The group secret key can be reconstructed by n secret shares such that x � i s equal to 
n-l 
the summation of all n secret shares, i.e. x^ x. (mod q) • 
(=0 
4. The group public key used in the unsigncryption algorithm is the DL public key of x�， 
i.e. yG = g'G. 
Proof of theorem 3: 
Given a valid signcrypted text (c, r,s) and valid group public key , it suffices to show 
that the recovered ephemeral key e in Eq. (13) of unsigncryption algorithm is the same 
ephemeral key e as in Eq. (26) of the (n, n) threshold signcryption algorithm. Denote the 
recovered ephemeral key by . 
To perform the (n, n) threshold signcryption algorithm "5CA, it requires all n secret shares 
to calculate the value of s . From the Eq. (30) and Eq. (28), we have: 
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s = ^Sj(modq) 
jeU 




= ( r . � + X X -r){modq) 
jeU 
As a result, the resulting signcrypted text has the following forms: 
c = E丁“ Jm) (32) 
r 二 H,丨丨⑷(m) ( 3 3 ) 
s = (r'X^ + - r)(mod q) (34) 
Comparing the above signcrypted text to the normal single signer signcrypted text, the 
signcrypted text in Eq. (32 — 34) represents a normal single signer signcrypted text produced by a 
signer with private key Hence, any signcrypted text produced by this (n, n) threshold 
signcryption algorithm "SCA can be unsigncrypted by the normal unsigncryption algorithm 
USCA. 
In order word, the recipient will use the values of r and s in Eq. (33) and Eq. (34) to 




=g (mod p) 
=;y/，f"�(mod p) 
= e 
Since the recovered ephemeral key and original ephemeral key e are the same, and 
keyed hash function of the (n, n) threshold signcryption algorithm "SCA and unsigncryption 
algorithm USCA are the same, the unsigncryption algorithm USCA can correctly recover the 
message m and hence it can correctly validate the authenticity of the message. This completes 
the proof for theorem 3. 
The second criteria for correctness - all n members' participation are required to jointly 
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produce a valid signcrypted text - is obvious. Without any one's participation, equation 
n-\ 
XG =^JC,.(mod^) has a random component, which prevents the computation of group private 
/=0 
key Xg . 
Consequently, the correctness of the (n, n) Threshold Signcryption Scheme is proved. 
4.2.3 Security Analysis 
Assume the underlying signcryption and unsigncryption algorithm of the n) threshold 
signcryption scheme is secure which has been proved in [7, 9]; the security issue of the 
signcryption scheme is the forgeability. 
Theorem 4 (Unconditional unforgeabiUty of "SCA and USCA algorithm pair): The (n, n) 
threshold signcryption algorithm "5CA and unsigncryption algorithm USCA pairs are secure 
against forgery attack. 
Proof of Theorem 4: 
To prove theorem 4，we firstly consider how the signcrypted text can be forged and 
subsequently show that it is infeasible. 
For the outsider, his/her adversarial view contains g , p , q , ；y“，and ；y^ . To forge a 
valid signcrypted text, he/she needs to get the group private key j c � b y solving the following 
equation: 
= p) (36) 
Solving Eq. (36) is a discrete logarithm problem, which is computationally infeasible. As a 
result, no outsider can forge a valid signcrypted text on behalf of the designated group. 
Thus, CSCA - USCA) pair is secure against forgery attack and theorem 4 is proved. 
Consequently, given the assumption that the key generation party is trustworthy and by the 




A Threshold Proxy Signcryption 
Scheme 
In this chapter, two new threshold proxy signcryption schemes are presented. The threshold 
proxy signcryption scheme is used to delegate the signcryption rights to a group of people so that 
they can do the signcryption on behalf of the principal, or the original signer. This scheme 
involves n + 2 parties, which are the principal (original signer), Alice, the receiver, Bob, and n 
entrusted proxy agents, or proxy signers. 
When considering the delegation of rights, there are three different types of delegation, 
namely, full delegation, partial delegation and delegation by warrant. In the full delegation model, 
a proxy signer and the principal share the same signature key to do the signing operation. 
Obviously, such kind of delegation is undesirable as it has too many flaws, such as repudiation 
and indistinguishability. On the other hand, the partial delegation approach requires the proxy 
signer to have a new proxy signature key, which is created from the signature key of principal, to 
produce a proxy signed document. Under this approach, the proxy signature is distinguishable 
from the original digital signature, as well as there is no need to reveal the signature key of the 
principal to others. However, there is no specification on the valid period of the proxy signer, so 
the proxy signer can create a proxy signature forever. To combat this problem, another approach, 
delegation by warrant, emerges. In such approach, warrant is used to certify that in what period 
the proxy signer is trustworthy by the principal. Our proposed threshold proxy signcryption is of 
partial delegation type. 
In this chapter, we assume that Alice, with (X，;y") DL key pair, wants to delegate her 
signcryption rights to the proxy signers and let them to signcrypted the message, m, on behalf of 
her to Bob, with DL key pair. In the following, two schemes: a (r, n)-threshold proxy 
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signcryption scheme and a (n, w)-threshold proxy signcryption scheme with improved complexity 
are presented. 
In 0，n)-threshold proxy signcryption scheme, the participation of t members out of a group 
of n members are required to produce the proxy signcryption on behalf of the original signer. 
In contrast, in (n, n)-threshold proxy signcryption scheme, the participation of all members 
in a group of n members are required to produce the proxy signcryption on behalf of the original 
signer. As all members in the group are called in participation, it is also known as group proxy 
signcryption. In this sense, (t, «)-threshold proxy signcryption scheme is a general threshold 
proxy signcryption scheme, while («, n)-threshold proxy signcryption scheme is its specific case. 
In the case of t = n, there are some techniques to reduce the complexity of the protocol. 
In this chapter, it has the following organization. A (t, «)-threshold proxy signcryption 
scheme will be proposed in section 5.1. In section 5.2，A (n, n)-threshold proxy signcryption 
scheme with improved complexity will be presented. 
5.1 A (f, w)_Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme 
A (t, n)-Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme is a 2-stage scheme in which the principal 
delegates its signcryption rights to a group of n proxy signers in the first stage and t proxy signers 
in the designated group produce a valid proxy signcrypted text on behalf of the principal to 
receiver, Bob, in second stage. 
5.1.1 Scheme Description 
In the 0，n)-Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme, it consists of 3 components. They are (f, 
n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation protocol, (r, n) Threshold Signcryption algorithm, and the 
Unsigncryption algorithm. 
The 0，n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation protocol is a preparation stage. In this 
preparation stage, the original signer generates a group key pair = which satisfies 
XG =x^+kK where K = g�and k is randomly chosen. The original signer then uses secret 
sharing technique on group private key jc^ j to generate the proxy shares. The original signer 
then sends the proxy shares and direct form certificate K to all proxy signers. The details of (r, 
n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation protocol are as follow: 
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Protocol: (r, n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation 
SUMMARY: In this protocol, the trusted original signer first generates a group DL key pairs 
fe，；Vg 二 •？” with some relations to his/her personal DL public and private key 
pairs and uses the (r, n) secret sharing technique to generate n secret shares on the 
group private key jc^. Afterward, these secret shares are distributed to n proxy 
signers in a verifiable manner. 
INPUT: Defined public parameters, p, q, g, and 
Alice's key pair {x ,^ y J . 
OUTPUT: For each signer 尸,，ieU, the unique signer's ID and the group secret share, 
0•，义,)• 
For the whole group, the direct form certificate K . 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Generation of group secret. 
1.1 The principal, Alice, randomly chooses x, where \<x<q-\. 
1.2 Alice computes 
K = g''{mo&p) (37) 
1.3 Alice computes group's private key: 
jCg mod(p-1) (38) 
1.4 Alice computes group's public key: 
y, = g'^(modp) (39) 
2. Generation of proxy shares. 
2.1 The principal, Alice, chooses a random polynomial over Z^ of degree t - 1 such 
that: 
f(z) = + + a 卜丨 丨(mod … （40) 
2.2 Alice generates n unique number in Z^ which are the ID of proxy agents. 
t/ 二 {w,. I w,.，wj e Zq & i, j E Z„_, & u丨本 Uj & i * j] 
2.3 Alice generates n proxy private keys (secret shares). For each u.eU , we have: 
太“ 二/(w, )(mod … (41) 
2.4 Alice sends (u丨，，K) securely to proxy signer . 
2.5 Alice broadcasts (y�，客〜容，..•，客“) to all proxy signers in the group. 
3. Verification of proxy share. 
3.1 Each Pi, ieU , checks whether the following equation is justified. 
g" =y,xfl(g""y"(modp) (42) 
n=l 
3.2 IfF/，ieU, finds that Eq. (42) is not justified, P, rejects and broadcasts (i,x.). 
53 
3.3 IfP“ /G t / , receives (j,Xj),where Pi rejects ( / , x � . 
3.4 If any proxy agent rejects, the protocol terminates. 
4. Verification of group public key 
4.1 Each Pi, ieU , checks whether the following equation is justified. 
y^ = y^-K'(modp) (43) 
4.2 If the above equation is not justified, the protocol is rejected and terminated. 
In the above protocol, the verification processes is needed for the correctness of the 
signcryption process. 
When t proxy members out of a group of n members want to produce a proxy signcrypted 
text on behalf of the original signer, they will jointly execute the following (t, n) threshold 
signcryption algorithm. The details of this algorithm are as follow: 
Algorithm: (t, n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption PSCA) 
SUMMARY: The (r, n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption algorithm requires at least t proxy signers' 
participation so as to jointly signcrypted the message on behalf of the original 
signer. If more than t signers, choose t of them randomly. Let [ be a set 
containing all the ID of participating signers. 
INPUT: Defined public parameters, p, q, g, 
Each participating signer's secret share ( / , ) for all ieU , 
Direct form certificate, K， 
Receiver's public key , 
The message m，and 
The (r, ")-Threshold Signcryption Algorithm C,SCA) 
OUTPUT: A Proxy Signcrypted Text (c, r, 5, K). 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Execution of the (r, «)-Threshold Signcryption ("SCA) with the following input 
parameters: 
• t proxy shares (/，x,.) for all ieU , 
• Defined public parameters p, q,g, 
• Receiver's public key ， 
• The message m. 
Thereby, we have the following signcrypted text: 
(c, r, s) 
2. Appending of the direct form certificate, K . The proxy signcrypted text is: 
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(c，r,s,K) 
In the (r, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme, the (t, n) threshold signcryption algorithm 
is identical to the execution of the (r, n) threshold signcryption algorithm ；5CA, which is 
discussed in section 4.1 of Chapter 4，followed by the appendance of the direct form certificate 
K . This consecutive execution model is shown in Figure 5.1.1. 
PaMk fTTecret shares: F m ^ ^ ^ I Direct FormI 
Parameters: : public key: Certificate: T 
(/，x》，/ef/ 肌 y^ K P 
i I ——1—. 
^ ^ (, , ") 
“ — ‘ 一 Threshold 
(c, r,s) Proxy 
^ ^ y Signcryption 
Concatenation: ^PSCA 
{c,r,s) + K J 
• 
\{c,r,s,K)\ Output 
Figure 5.1.1: (t, n) 一 Threshold Proxy Signcryption Algorithm {",PSCA) 
When the receiver, Bob, receives the proxy signcryption text (c, r, s, K)，he will execute the 
following Proxy Unsigncryption algorithm to recover the original message m and do the 
authentication check on the received proxy signcrypted text ic,r,s,K). The details of the 
algorithm are as follow: 
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Algorithm: Proxy Unsigncryption ( P U S C A ) 
SUMMARY: To verify the authenticity of and recovers the plaintext m from signcrypted text. 
INPUT: Defined public parameters p, q, g. 
Received Proxy Signcrypted Text (c, r, s’ K), 
The original signer's public key y^, and 
The designated receiver's private key x^. 
OUTPUT: Original plaintext m. 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Proxy Group's public key Recovery: 
y^ = (mod p) (44) 
2. Execution of the Unsigncryption ( U S C A ) with the following input parameters: 
• The recovered proxy group public key ， 
• Defined public parameters p, q, g, 
• The Received Signcrypted Text (c, r, s)， 
• The designated receiver's private key x^. 
The above Proxy Unsigncryption algorithm PUSCA can be viewed as a consecutive 
execution of Eq. (44) and the Unsigncryption algorithm USCA，which is defined in section 4.1.1 
of Chapter 4. The design of this algorithm is illustrated in Figure 5.1.2. 
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Receiver's~ Public Proxy Signcrypted Original Signer's 
private key: Parameters: Text: public Key: Input 
Xb P. q.g y^ 
• 
• Splitter 
K n ^ ± % Proxy 
Recovery of proxy group public key: Unsigncrypt 
-ion 
L ya=y.^irnodp) _ p^ SCA 
i 丄 j f e ^ i^v 
Execution of Unsigncryption Algorithm: 
USCA 
i 
|{m，success} OR {{(/>, failure)}] Output 
Figure 5.1.2: Proxy Unsigncryption Algorithm (PUSCA) 
To conclude, a {t,办Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme proposed in this subsection 
consists of three components, which are (t, n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation Protocol 
"tPSG^^P, (t, n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption Algorithm "PSCA, and Proxy Unsigncryption 
Algorithm PUSCA. 
5.1.2 Validity Analysis 
To prove the correctness of the 0，n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme, we have to show 
that the following two statements are valid. (1) Given a valid proxy signcrypted text {c,r,s,K) 
and the designated receiver's private key x^ ，the Proxy Unsigncryption Algorithm PUSCA can 
recover the original plaintext message m and check the authenticity of the received proxy 
signcrypted text (c, r, s, K). (2) The proposed (t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme requires 
t or more proxy members out of a group of n members to jointly produce a valid proxy 
signcryption. Note that, the above two statements are based on the assumption that no 
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participating parties cheat in the execution of the scheme. 
The validity of the statement 1 is equivalent to the validity of the {t, n) Threshold Proxy 
Signcryption "PSCA and Proxy Unsigncryption PUSCA algorithms pair. To show the validity 
of algorithms pair (； PSCA, PUSCA )，we utilize the theorem 1 in section 4.1.2 of Chapter 4. 
To use theorem 1，we need to prove the following two lemmas first. 
Lemma 1: A Lagrange Interpolation Polynomial / � can be reconstructed from any t proxy 
shares, (/,jc.), such that the constant term of that polynomial is the proxy group private key, i.e. 
XG = /(O). 
Proof for Lemma 1: 
In the (r, n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation protocol ("PSG'^'^l the original signer 
chooses a random polynomial of degree t- \ over Z^. 
fiz) = JCc + a, z + •.. + (mod q) (45) 
And the proxy share is calculated from the above polynomial by x= f(u^)(modq). 
Hence, by Lagrange Interpolation theorem, given any t such shares, the polynomial f{z) in Eq. 
(45) can be reconstructed. In the Eq. (45), we see that the constant term is the group private key 
XG . This completes the proof for lemma 1. 
Lemma 2: The group public key, ；y�=«?'。，can be faithfully recovered from the original 
signer's public key ；y" and direct form certificate K . 
Proof for lemma 2: 
In the (t, n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation protocol ( ; P 5 ' G t h e original signer 
relates the group private key to its private key by the following equation: 
XG =^x^+x-Kmodip-l) (46) 
Using Eq. (46), we have the following relation: 
gXG = (mod p) (47) 
y^ = (mod p) (48) 
In the Proxy Unsigncryption Algorithm PUSCA，the group public key is recovered by the 
Eq. (48). Hence, this completes the proof for the lemma 2. 
Since no parties will cheat and from the result of lemma 1 and lemma 2，the validity of the 0， 
n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption ^PSCA and Proxy Unsigncryption PUSCA algorithms pair is 
proved by Theorem 1. As a result, our proposed {t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme is 
correct. 
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5.1.3 Security Analysis 
The security issues of the (t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme are unforgeability and 
distinguishability. In this section, we will prove our proposed (J, n) threshold proxy signcryption 
scheme is secure against forgery attacks based on the assumption that the original signer is a 
trustworthy party and fulfills the requirement of distinguishability. 
By means of unforgeability, only sufficient number of designated proxy signers can produce 
a valid proxy signcrypted text on behalf of the original signer. Specifically, if the number of 
colluding proxy members is less than the threshold parameter t，our scheme is secure against 
forgery attacks. 
To prove our scheme is secure against forgery attacks, two different perspectives will be 
considered. One is on the forgery attack by insiders and another one is on the forgery attack by an 
outsider. 
Since the {t, n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption Algorithm :PSCA and the Proxy 
Unsigncryption Algorithm PUSCA are the consecutive execution involving a (t, n) Threshold 
Signcryption Algorithm ；5CA and an Unsigncryption Algorithm USCA respectively, from the 
result of Theorem 2，it is obvious that the proposed (t, n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme 
is secure against forgery attack provided that there are less than t proxy members colluding. 
For an outsider, he/she can carry out two kinds of forgery attack. The first forgery attack is 
to forge a valid proxy signcrypted text of the designated proxy group with direct form certificate 
K. The second forgery attack is to pretend he/she is a designated proxy signer or group and 
produce the corresponding valid proxy signcrypted text on behalf of the original signer. 
Indeed, the first kind forgery attack mentioned above is computationally infeasible. The 
adversarial view of an outsider contains g , p, q’ K , y^, and • In order to produce the 
fake valid proxy signcrypted text, the adversary needs to know the designated group private key 
X". Since the adversarial view doesn't contain the random number x generated by the original 
signer and the private key x^ of the original signer, the adversary cannot compute x � f r o m Eq. 
(38). The only way for the adversary to compute the group private key is by solving the 
following equation. 
y^=g'^{modp) (49) 
However, solving Eq. (49) is a discrete logarithm problem, which is computationally 
infeasible. As a result, no outsider can forge a valid signcrypted text as it is produced by the 
designated group. 
Moreover, it is also infeasible for an outsider to carry out the second kind forgery attack 
mentioned above. In order to produce a valid proxy signcrypted text, the adversary needs to find 
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the group private key x � a n d the direct form certificate K . Although the adversary can 
randomly choose the group private key x � o r the direct form certificate K，he/she needs to 
find the corresponding direct form certificate K or the group private key x � b y the following 
equation. 
Xg =x^-\-x-Kmod{p-l) (50) 
However, x“ in Eq. (50) is unknown to the adversary. Therefore, the adversary cannot find 
the correspondence. Thus, the second kind of attack becomes infeasible. 
For the distinguishability, it is obvious that the recipient can differentiate the proxy 
signcrypted text produced by one proxy group from the one produced by the other proxy group by 
the direct form certificate K . Moreover, the recipient can also differentiate the proxy 
signcrypted text by the proxy group from the normal signcrypted text produced by the original 
signer. 
As a result, our proposed (t, n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme is secure against 
forgery attack with an assumption that the original signer is a trustworthy party and fulfills the 
requirement of distinguishability. 
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5.2 A (w，w)-Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme 
with Improved Complexity 
In the (n, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme, it requires the collaboration of all proxy 
members in a group of n members so as to produce the proxy signcryption on behalf of the 
original signer. Thereby, it is also known as proxy group signcryption scheme. 
In the (n, n) threshold signcryption scheme, the complexity can be improved because there 
is no need to employ the (r, n) secret sharing technique in both group key generation and 
signcryption algorithm, as all members in the proxy group are required to participate. 
5.2.1 Scheme Description 
In the (n, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme, it consists of 2 stages. The first stage is a 
preparation stage, while the second one is the actual threshold proxy signcryption and the 
corresponding unsigncryption stage. 
In this subsection, an improved complexity («，n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme is 
presented. It is defined by a triplet (IPSG"^', "5CA, PUSCA). IPSG"^' is a (n, n) threshold 
proxy share generation with trustworthy original signer protocol. "5CA is a {n, n) threshold 
signcryption algorithm, which is defined in the (n, n) threshold signcryption scheme in section 
4.2.1 of Chapter 4，and PUSCA is the proxy unsigncryption algorithm, which is defined in the 
(n, n) threshold signcryption scheme in section 5.1.1 of Chapter 5. 
The first stage of this scheme, (n，n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation C^PSG'^ '^  )，is the 
delegation stage in which the original signer (principal) and proxy signers (proxy agents) interact 
to generate the proxy private and public key pairs. It is a n+1 parties protocol and is only required 
to be executed once. The details of the (n, n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation ( ) are as 
follow: 
Protocol: (w, n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation 尸) 
SUMMARY: In this algorithm, the trustworthy original signer generates a group secret (group 
private key) x�and randomly choosing n distinct pieces of secret shares jc, 
such that the summation of n secret shares equals to group private key, i.e. 
Xg The original signer then distributes these n distinct secret 
1=0 
shares to n proxy members P,. 
INPUT: Defined public parameters, p, q, g. 
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Original signer's DL key pair (x�，;y J . 
OUTPUT: For each signer ieU ’ the unique signer's ID and the group secret share, 
ihx.). 
The group public key y^ .，and 
Direct form certificate K . 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Generation of signer's ID: 
1.1 The trusted party generates n unique number in Z^ such that the signer's ID 
belongs to the set U : 
U = {m, I u�uj e Z" & & u 丨 * Uj & i 本 j} 
1.2 The trusted party then sends the signer's ID ton signers. 
2. Generation of group's key pair. 
2.1 The principal, Alice, randomly chooses x, where l<x<q-l. 
2.2 Alice computes 
K = g''imodp) (51) 
2.3 Alice computes group's private key: 
jCg = jc^ +x-Kmod{p-l) (52) 
2.4 Alice computes group's public key: 
�（mod/7) (53) 
3. Generation of proxy shares: 
3.1 Alice generates n proxy private key. Note: the key pair for proxy agent P“ is 
{x^，}V). Alice randomly chooses x", e Z* such that 
i=0 
3.2 Alice sends securely to proxy agent P“, 
In the above protocol, the simplest secret sharing technique is employed. Therefore, the 
complexity of the protocol is reduced. 
The second portions of this scheme are the (n, n) threshold signcryption and proxy 
unsigncryption algorithms. 
For the (n, n) threshold proxy signcryption algorithm "PSCA ’ it is actually the consecutive 
execution of the (n, n) Threshold Signcryption Algorithm "5CA of the {n, n) Threshold 
Signcryption Scheme, which is discussed in section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4，and the appendance of the 
direct form certificate K. The details of this algorithm are as follow: 
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Algorithm: (n, n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption CPSCA ) 
SUMMARY: In {n, n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption algorithm, it requires all n proxy signers' 
participation so as to jointly signcrypted the message on behalf of the original 
signer. 
INPUT: Defined public pa rame te r sq , g. 
Each participant's secret share, (i,x.) for all ieU, such that the group private 
key jc^  and the secret shares x. have the following relation: 
n-\ 
Xg = � , ( m o d 礼 
1=0 
Direct form certificate, K， 
Receiver's public key ；y"， 
The message m，and 
The (n, n)-Threshold Signcryption Algorithm ("SCA) 
OUTPUT: A Proxy Signcrypted Text (c,r,s,K). 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Exercise of the (n, n)-Threshold Signcryption ( "SCA ) with the following input 
parameters: 
• n proxy shares (i,x^) for all ieU , 
• Defined public parameters p, q, g, 
• Receiver's public key y^ ， 
• The message m. 
Thereby, we have the following signcrypted text: 
(c，r, s) 
2. Appending of the direct form certificate, K. The proxy signcrypted text is: 
{c,r,s,K) 
This consecutive execution model is shown in Figure 5.2.1. 
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(c, r,s) Proxy 
^ y f Signcryption 
Concatenation: "PSCA 
ic,r,s) + K 
• 
\{c,r,s,K)\ Output 
Figure 5.2.1: («，n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption Algorithm ("P5CA) 
For the proxy unsigncryption, it is identical to the Proxy Unsigncryption Algorithm 
PUSCA of the (r, n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme, which is discussed in section 5.1.1 
of Chapter 5. 
5.2.2 Validity Analysis 
In this subsection, the correctness of the proposed ("，n) threshold signcryption scheme is 
discussed. The validity of the scheme based on the assumption that no participating parties cheat 
in the execution of the proposed scheme carries two meanings. Firstly, given a valid proxy 
signcrypted text the proxy unsigncryption algorithm PUSCA should be able to 
recover the message m and do the authentication check on the received proxy signcrypted text 
(c, r, K) . Secondly, the proposed (n, n) threshold signcryption scheme should fulfill the 
requirement that the participations of all proxy members in a proxy group of n members are 
required to jointly produce the valid proxy signcrypted text (c, r, s, K). 
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To show that the proposed (n, n) threshold signcryption scheme satisfies the above criteria, 
we need to use the validity result of "5CA and PUSCA algorithms. 
First of all, we need to look back the input and output relationship of the (n, n) threshold 
signcryption algorithm "5CA. To execute Algorithm "5CA, we need all secret shares of n 
proxy members that satisfy the following requirement: the summation of all proxy secret shares is 




Obviously, the above equation is satisfied by those proxy secret shares generated by the (n, 
n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation、：PSG"^ ? ) protocol. Therefore, after the execution of the 
Algorithm "SCA , the group signcrypted text (c, r,s) is produced. This signcrypted text 
(c,r,5) is unsigncryptable by the unsigncryption algorithm USCA with group public key 
as an input. The («，n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption algorithm ("PSCA ) just appends the direct 
form certificate K to that signcrypted text {c,r,s). 
In the proxy unsigncryption algorithm PUSCA，it uses the direct form certificate K to 
recover the group public key which corresponds to the group private key x � s u c h that 
jc^  From the result of Theorem 3，the (n, n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption 
i=0 
Scheme is valid. 
5.2.3 Security Analysis 
Similar to the security issues of the {t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme, the security 
issues of the (n, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme are unforgeability and distinguishability. 
In this section, we will prove our proposed (n, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme is secure 
against forgery attacks based on the assumption that the original signer is a trustworthy party and 
fulfills the requirement of distinguishability. 
In this section, the proposed scheme is proved to be secure against forgery attacks in two 
different perspectives. One is on the forgery attack by insiders and another one is on the forgery 
attack by an outsider. 
Notice that the (w, n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption Algorithm "PSCA and the Proxy 
Unsigncryption Algorithm PUSCA are the consecutive executions involving a (n, n) Threshold 
Signcryption Algorithm "5CA and an Unsigncryption Algorithm USCA respectively. The 
unforgeability of "PSCA and PUSCA algorithms pair can be reduced to that of "SCA and 
USCA algorithm pair. By the result of Theorem 2, it is unconditionally unforgeable. Hence, 
unless all the proxy signers collude, the proposed scheme is secure against insider's forgery 
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attack. 
For an outsider, he/she can carry out two kinds of forgery attack. The first forgery attack is 
to forge a valid proxy signcrypted text of the designated proxy group with direct form certificate 
K . The second forgery attack is to pretend he/she is a designated proxy signer or group and 
produce the corresponding valid proxy signcrypted text on behalf of the original signer. 
Indeed, the first kind forgery attack mentioned above is computationally infeasible. The 
adversarial view of an outsider contains g , p, q , K , y^, and • ^  order to produce the 
fake valid proxy signcrypted text, the adversary needs to know the designated group private key 
jc广.Since the adversarial view doesn't contain the random number x generated by the original 
signer and the private key of the original signer, the adversary cannot compute x � f r o m Eq. 
(52). The only way for the adversary to compute the group private key x � i s by solving the 
following equation. 
y^ = p) (56) 
However, solving Eq. (56) is a discrete logarithm problem, which is computationally 
infeasible. As a result, no outsider can forge a valid signcrypted text as it is produced by the 
designated group. 
Moreover, it is also infeasible for an outsider to carry out the second kind of forgery attack 
mentioned above. In order to produce a valid proxy signcrypted text, the adversary needs to find 
the group private key jc^ and the direct form certificate K . Although the adversary can 
randomly choose the group private key or the direct form certificate K，he/she needs to 
find the corresponding direct form certificate K or the group private key by the following 
equation. 
jCc =X^+X'K mod(p -1) (57) 
However, in Eq. (57) is unknown to the adversary. Therefore, the adversary cannot find 
the correspondence. Thus, the second kind of attack becomes infeasible. 
For the distinguishability, it is obvious that the recipient can differentiate the proxy 
signcrypted text produced by one proxy group from the one produced by the other proxy group by 
the direct form certificate K • Moreover, the recipient can also differentiate the proxy 
signcrypted text by the proxy group from the normal signcrypted text produced by the original 
signer. 
As a result, our proposed (n, n) Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme is secure against 
forgery attack with an assumption that the original signer is a trustworthy party and fulfills the 
requirement of distinguishability. 
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Chapter 6 
A Non-Repudiated Threshold Proxy 
Signcryption Scheme 
In the previously proposed threshold proxy signcryption scheme, it has one assumption. It 
assumes that the principal is a trustworthy party. In other words, the principal won't cheat. 
However, this assumption will lead to a repudiation problem. The problem of repudiation lies on 
the group secret key and proxy secret key generation protocol, i.e. the general (r, n) protocol 
IPSG'^ and the improved specific (w, n) protocol :PSGUP discussed in section 5.1.1 and 
5.2.1 respectively. 
In the original Proxy Share Generation Protocol, ；F^G"^ " or :PSG爪，the principal 
firstly generates a proxy group secret key and uses secret sharing technique to distribute the secret 
shares to a group of proxy agents. 
In the proposed threshold proxy signcryption scheme, the participating proxy agents run the 
threshold signcryption algorithm to produce a proxy signcrypted text, which is as same as that 
produced by normal signcryption with proxy group secret key as an input. Therefore, anyone 
knows the proxy group secret key can produce a valid proxy signcrypted text. In the above key 
generation algorithm, the principal knows the proxy group secret key; thereby, the principal can 
produce a valid proxy signcrypted text by himself or herself along. 
Consequently, if the proxy agents do not trust the principal and more than t - 1 proxy 
agents collude, they can produce a valid proxy signcrypted text and deny that they have ever 
produced it in later time as the principal has the capability in producing such proxy signcrypted 
text. This is the case where the proxy agents are cheating. 
On the contrary, the principal can also produce a valid proxy signcrypted text and deny 
doing so in later time. This time, the cheating party is the principal. In other word, both the 
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principal and the proxy agents are unprotected. This is known as a repudiation problem. 
To alleviate this problem, the keys and shares generation protocol must be designed in a 
way that all participants, including the principal and all proxy agents, have no knowledge on the 
group secret key in the generation of group secret key. 
The above idea can be realized by exploiting the concept of blind signature. Since our 
threshold proxy signcryption scheme is based on discrete logarithm problem and Nyberg-Rueppel 
signature scheme is also based on discrete logarithm problem, we start our works on the blinded 
Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme. 
In this chapter, the details on how to construct a secure key generation protocol from 
blinded Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme will be given and a new non-repudiated threshold 
proxy signcryption scheme is presented. The organization of this chapter is as follows. In section 
6.1，Non-repudiated Proxy Shares Generation is discussed. In section 6.2，an attack to 
Non-repudiated Proxy Shares Generation, “Rushing Attack", is presented. The improved 
non-repudiated proxy shares generation, "Non-repudiated and Un-cheatable Proxy Shares 
Generation", and the resulting un-cheatable and non-repudiated (r, n) threshold proxy 
signcryption scheme are proposed in section 6 3 and 6.4 respectively. 
6.1 Non-repudiated Proxy Shares Generation 
To have an undeniable feature, here we show how to adopt the blinded Nyberg-Rueppel 
signature scheme, which is discussed in section 2.6.2, to construct a secure key generation 
protocol, in which no participants, including the principal and all proxies, have the complete 
knowledge on the generated proxy group secret key (proxy group private key). 
From the blinded Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme, we can regard Alice as the principal of 
our scheme. Similarly, the role of Bob and the proxy agents are the same. When the principal has 
randomly chosen k and calculated r = g^(mod p), it is broadcasted to all proxy agents P,. 
Each proxy agent P, randomly chooses blinding factors a丨 .，P , and computes 
r. =m'g"' -F^'Cmod/?) and m,. = r. . r. and m. are then sent back to the 
principal. The principal then computes and broadcasts 5 = +k{mod q) to all proxy 
i 
agents. Each proxy agent then un-blinds 1 by a,, and p., i.e. 二 + (mod g). For O,") 
scheme, the group private key jc^  is equal to the summation of s. ’ which implies the following 
relation: 
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Xg 三 q 裕.m".g 一 A).义� (58) 
In order for the receiver to deduce the proxy public key from principal's public key, the 
proxy private key jc^； and principal's private key need to have the following relation: 
where ^ is a constant. 
To reduce Eq. (58) to the form expressed in Eq. (59), we have to set m = 二 1. Therefore, 
Eq. (58) is reduced to the following: 
Comparing Eq. (59) and Eq. (60), there is one more constant n in Eq. (60). Indeed, it is not a 
problem. It is because the receiver can still deduce the proxy public key from principal's public 
key. Let K = the relation between the proxy public key and principal's public key is 
shown below: 
Jo ( j / r - ^ (61) 
From Eq. (61)，it tells us that when the receiver wants to recover the proxy public key, the 
operation will incur one more exponentiation. This exponentiation actually can be eliminated by 
modifying the way the principal calculates ? : 
？ = w —1 ( Q m . + ？(mod q) (62) 
i 
By using Eq. (62), the private keys' relation and public keys' relation can be reduced to the 
following equations: 
义G 三 ,广“'+ " " ) .太細 （63) 
Therefore, such modification converts the exponentiation in receiver's unsigncryption 
algorithm, which may execute many times, to the multiplication in key generation protocol, 
which is required to be executed once. Hence, it improves the overall efficiency. 
By this derivation, the resulting scheme is essentially identical to the key generation part of 
the Zhang's threshold proxy signature scheme [54] (Figure 6.1.1). However, this key generation 
protocol suffers from a “Rushing” attack, which will be discussed m the following section. 
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Original Signer, Proxy Signer, 
O “ 
Z^, r. = g"'r (mod p) 
r. * 
tV a such that r G 
r = l l r '， q 
1=1 
s=n~'rx^ +kimodq) s • “ 〜 ， … 
= l丄厂，^^ +a^(modq) 
i=l 
(mod p) 
Figure 6.1.1: Zhang's Proxy Share Generation Protocol 
6.2 Rushing Attack 
In Zhang's (n, n) threshold proxy signature scheme [54], only a single member out of a 
group of n proxy members can perform an attack so that this member can obtain the original 
signer's digital signature on arbitrary message m . It is known as a Rushing attack (Figure 6.2.1). 
To carry out this attack, a single member of the group does the cheating at step 2(b). The 
details of an attack are described below: Without loss of generosity, let be the cheating 
member of the proxy group of n proxy members. The rest of proxy members are honest members. 
Denote them by PpP!,…’ Pn-i' During the preparation of proxy shares, the original signer and 
proxy members P”P” ., execute the ordinary Proxy Share Generation Protocol described 
in section 6.1. However, the cheating proxy member executes the following cheating protocol 
instead of the ordinary one. 
1. Upon receiving r from the original signer, the cheating member doesn't 
compute . The cheating member just waits until r”””…,r“ are received. 
2. Upon receiving all from the honest proxy member P”P”.",Pn—” the 
卜 1 V 
cheating member computes and broadcasts r„ where r„ =mr'" J][r. (mod p), 
V片 y 
and m = Rim). 
3. Upon receiving s from the original signer, the cheating member 尸"multiplies 5 
by n to obtain ns • 
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n 
4. The cheating member then computes r where r = . Now, {r,ns) is the 
/=i 
original signer's Nyberg-Rueppel signature on message m. 
In the above cheating protocol, the main point is that the cheating member waits at step 2(b) 
until he/she has received all r from other proxy signer P. for / =l，2，3，...，n-l. After 
receiving these numbers, instead of broadcasting r,=容议？(mod p) , he/she broadcasts 
w-l 
. (mod p). Therefore, when the original signer has received all 厂，the 
V J 
original signer computes the folio wings: 
(=1 
f n-l \ 
V '=1 ' J (65) 
f n-l \ f n-l 丫 1 
=llh 沿厂"ri'^ y 
V (=i J V y 
y 二 n—i. r . X + ^ (mod^) (66) 
The original signer then broadcasts 5 to all proxy members. When the cheating member 
multiplies s by n, he/she gets: 
ns = r-x + n- ？ (mod q) (67) 
As a result, the cheating proxy member can get the Nyberg-Rueppel signature of the 
original signer on arbitrary message m . Note that doing such cheating makes the whole group 
can't do the proxy signature. It is because doesn't know the a. • However, the original signer 
and the n-l honest proxy members don't know the cheating occurs until the first threshold proxy 
signature is requested. Although the cheating can be eventually detected, it is too late that the 
cheating member can use the valid signature to do some malicious things. The solution to this 
cheating attack is proposed in the following section. 
Figure 6.2.1 provides a graphical presentation of Rushing attack. In the figure, the double 
lined arrows indicate the values are transmitted in a broadcast channel. 
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Figure 6.2.1: Rushing Attack 
6.3 Non-repudiated and Un-cheatable Proxy Shares 
Generation 
To prevent Rushing attack, zero knowledge proof on each secret random number a. 
generated by proxy member P丨 is employed by the original signer. We now present our 
Un-cheatable (n, n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation Protocol, which is secure against the 
Rushing attack mentioned above (Figure 6.3.1). The steps of the protocol are as follow: 
Protocol: Un-cheatable {n, n) Threshold Proxy Group Private Key Generation (:PSG) 
SUMMARY: In this algorithm, the original signer and the n proxies jointly generate the 
blinded proxy group private key and each proxy signer un-blinds the group 
private key individually to get its corresponding proxy share. 
input： Defined pub lie p arameters ,p, q, g. 
Original signer's DL key pair (x^ ，y J . 
OUTPUT: For each signer P„ ieU, the unique signer's ID and the group secret share, 
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The group public key y^ j，and 
Direct form certificate K . 
The steps are as follow: 
1 Generation of original signer's secret random number. 
1.1 The original signer, Alice, randomly chooses a，such that a G 尺 Z � . 
1.2 Alice computes 
k^ = g"{modp) (68) 
1.3 Alice broadcasts k^  to all proxy signers. 
2 Generation of proxy signers' blinding factors. 
2.1 Each proxy signer F,, ieU , randomly generates p. such that A Z^ . 
2.2 Each proxy signer Pu ieU , computes 
ki=g3' -k^imod p) (69) 
23 Each proxy signer尸�，ieU , checks whether k, e Z / . 
If the check fails, Pi goes back to step 2.1. 
2.4 Each proxy signer, / 6 C/, computes y/. where 
y/. =g^^{modp) (70) 
and broadcasts to all parties. 
2.5 When proxy signer, ieU , has received all i//j from proxy signer Pj, 
yy e"\{/}，the proxy signer, P/broadcasts k. to all parties. 
3 The original signer computes the direct form certificate K , where 
K = Ylk.{modp) (71) 
ieU 
4 Zero-Knowledge Proof of p. of proxy signer F„ ie U : 
4.1 For each proxy signer, ie U , the original signer randomly generates a number 
V,- such that v,. e^j Z j . 
4.2 The original signer computes 
= g"' (mod p) (72) 
and sends C,- to the proxy signer P/. 
4.3 When the proxy signer F, receives ( from the original signer, the proxy signer Pi 
computes�where 
么 ( m o d p) (73) 
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and s e n d s � b a c k to the original signer. 
4.4 When the original signer r e c e i v e s � f r o m proxy signer P ,， i eU ’ the original 
signer checks whether 
(mod p) (74) 
4.5 If the above equation is not justified, cheating occurs and the original signer 
terminates the protocol. 
5 The original signer validates the direct form certificate K by: 
K=Y[WiXk;imod p) (75) 
ieU 
6 If the check fails, the original signer terminates the protocol. 
7 Generation of blinded group proxy private key. 
x = K-^ + a{modq) (76) 
n 
8 Individual Proxy Private Key Un-blinding Algorithm: 
8.1 Each proxy signer computes x, = x + fi. (mod q). (77) 
8.2 Each proxy signer 尸,checks if the following equality holds: K (mod p). 
If it holds, proxy signer P, accepts jc- as a valid proxy share from the original 
signer. Otherwise, P, broadcasts an error and stops. 
The above Un-cheatable (n, n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation Protocol can be used as 
proxy share generation component of Non-repudiated («，n) threshold proxy signature and 
Non-repudiated {n, n) threshold proxy signcryption. 
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Figure 6.3.1: Un-cheatable (w, n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation Protocol 
Based on the proposed Un-cheatable (n, n) Threshold Proxy Group Private Key Generation 
protocol, it can be extended to an Un-cheatable (t, n) Threshold Proxy Group Private Key 
Generation protocol by applying {t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, such as Petersen's 
Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme, to the output of the Un-cheatable (n, n) Threshold Proxy 
Group Private Key Generation protocol. The details are as follow: 
Protocol: Un-cheatable (r, n) Threshold Proxy Group Private Key Generation C^PSG) 
SUMMARY: The Un-cheatable (t, n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation Protocol is the 
consecutive execution of the Un-cheatable (n, n) Threshold Proxy Share 
Generation Protocol followed by the (r, n) threshold secret sharing scheme on the 
proxy members' private key x-. 
input： Defined public parameters, p, q, g. 
Original signer's DL key pair (x^ ，;y J . 
OUTPUT: For each signer Pi, ieU, the unique signer's ID i and the group secret share, 
z,” 
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The group public key y^，and 
Direct form certificate K . 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Generation of proxy agents' unique ID, such that: 
U = {U 丨 ： U I . ， U J G Z Q & I J G Z„—1 & U 丨本 U J & I * J � 
2. Execution of Un-cheatable (n, n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation Protocol to get 
；c-, ieU, and direct form certificate K. 
3. Execution of Petersen's Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme on to get the proxy 
share . Now, (/，z.，K) is the proxy share for ieU . 
6.4 An Un-cheatable and Non-repudiated (t, n) 
Threshold Proxy Signcryption 
In this section, we propose a non-repudiated {U n)-threshold proxy signcryption scheme. It 
enables the principal to delegate its signcryption rights to a group of n proxy signers such that at 
least t proxy signers in the designated group are required to produce a valid and undeniable proxy 
signcrypted text on behalf of the principal (the original signer). 
In section 6.4.1，we present an un-cheatable and non-repudiated (t, n) threshold proxy 
signcryption scheme. The corresponding validity analysis and security analysis are discussed in 
section 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 respectively. 
6.4.1 Scheme Description 
Our un-cheatable and non-repudiated {t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme consists of 
three main components. They are the proxy shares generation protocol, (J, n) threshold proxy 
signcryption algorithm and proxy unsigncryption algorithm. 
Our scheme enables the principal to delegate its signcryption rights to a group of n proxy 
signers such that at least t proxy signers in the designated group are required to produce a proxy 
signcrypted text on behalf of the principal (the original signer) with the following properties: (1) 
non-repudiation, (2) distinguishability, (3) un-cheatable, and (4) unforgeability. 
To have an undeniable and un-cheatable features, we adopt the Un-cheatable (t, n) 
Threshold Proxy Share Generation Protocol presented in section 6.3 as a proxy shares generation 
protocol. 
After the execution of Un-cheatable (t, n) Threshold Proxy Share Generation Protocol the 
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proxy member ieU, has the proxy share z,，and the direct form certificate K . 
To produce a valid proxy signcrypted text (c,r,5,A：), t proxy members execute the (t, 
•Threshold Proxy Signcryption Algorithm described in section 5.1.1. The proxy signcrypted text 
(c, r, 5, K) is then sent to the recipient, Bob (Figure 6.4.1). 
When the recipient receives the proxy signcrypted text (c, r, s, K) ’ he executes the 
following Proxy Unsigncryption Algorithm to recover the message m and do the authentication 
check on the received proxy signcrypted text (c, r, s, K). 
Algorithm: New Proxy Unsigncryption (PUSCA2) 
SUMMARY: To verify the authenticity of and recover the plaintext m from signcrypted text. 
INPUT: Defined public parameters p, q, g, 
Received Proxy Signcrypted Text (c, r，s, K)， 
The original signer's public key ；y", and 
The designated receiver's private key x办. 
OUTPUT: Original plaintext m. 
The steps are as follow: 
1. Proxy Group's public key Recovery: 
Jg = • K(mod p) (78) 
2. Exercise of the Unsigncryption (USCA) with the following input parameters: 
• The recovered proxy group public key ， 
• Defined public parameters p,q’g, 
• The Received Signcrypted Text (c, r, s)， 
• The designated receiver's private key x^. 
The above New Proxy Unsigncryption algorithm PUSCA2 is very similar to the Proxy 
Unsigncryption algorithm PUSCA defined in section 5.1.1 except the proxy group's public key 
recovery equation. It can be viewed as a consecutive execution of Eq. (78) and the 
Unsigncryption algorithm USCA，which is defined in section 4.1.1 
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Proxy Signer, Receiver 
� 
n, e z : ， � = J；'- (mod 
j^U 
c = £(m)’ r = H^{m), 
s. + - r ( m o d q ) ‘ _ _ 
厂 (c.r.s.K) y,=y^K(modp) 
e = (g 州 广(mod p) 
？ 
check if r = HT“eM) 
Figure 6.4.1: Threshold Proxy Signcryption and Unsigncryption 
6.4.2 Validity Analysis 
Validity: It suffices to show that the recovered proxy public key in Eq. (78) during the 
Proxy Unsigncryption Algorithm executed by the recipient corresponds to the private key x� 
used in the (t, n)-Threshold Signcryption Algorithm executed by the proxy group. 
Proof of Validity: Denote the recovered proxy public key by and the proper proxy 
public key by , where satisfies the following relation: 
(modp) (79) 
We show that provided no one cheat. Firstly, we determine the relation between t 
pieces of secret shares (/，z,)’ i = and the group private key . [Without loss of 
generality, we assume the first t members of the group are participating.] 
When considering the polynomial f{w) in Petersen's Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme, 
we have: 






Xg 三q /(O) (81) 
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By Lagrange Interpolating polynomial, 
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Since the recovered proxy public key corresponds to the proxy private key used in the 
signcryption algorithm, the recipient can recover and authenticate the original message m by 
the New Proxy Unsigncryption Algorithm with recovered proxy public key This completes 
the validity proof. 
6.4.3 Security Analysis 
The security issues of the non-repudiated (r, ")-threshold proxy signcryption scheme are the 
forgeability, distinguishability, and the repudiability. 
The forgeability issue can be considered in three perspectives. One is from the outsider, one 
is from the proxy singers, and one is from the principal. 
From the view of the outsider, the outsider is unable to forge a valid designated proxy 
signcrypted text or to pretend as a designated proxy signer of the original signer. The reason is 
that to forge a valid designated proxy signcrypted text amounts to solving a discrete logarithm 
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problem or Eq. (86) in which jc"，a and p. for i = l，2”",n are unknown to the outsider. 
jCg == K.Xu + (86) 
ieU 
Moreover, to pretend as a designated proxy signer also amounts to solving a discrete 
logarithm problem, as it needs to compute the value of K from y�= y/K(mod p). 
From the view of the principal, it is also computational infeasible to forge a proxy 
signcrypted text produced by the designated proxy group. It is because solving x � f r o m 
=及〜（mod p) is a discrete logarithm problem. Although the proxy signer has knowledge on 
X , (3f,and K, he/she can't compute x � a s p. is unknown to him/her in Eq. (86). 
From the view of the proxy group, it is obvious that less that t proxy agents can't produce 
the valid proxy signcrypted text. Furthermore, less than t colluding proxy agents can't reveal the 
group private key. Hence, our scheme is secure against forgery attack. 
For the repudiability, since only the designated proxy group can jointly use the proxy private 
key to produce a valid authorized proxy signcrypted signature and the digital signcryption scheme 
has been proved to be unforgeable [7，9], the proposed scheme has the feature of non-repudiation. 
For the distinguishability, it is obvious that the recipient can clearly distinguish the ordinary 
signcrypted text from the proxy signcrypted text. 
To conclude, our proposed (t,…-threshold proxy signcryption scheme is secure provided 





In this thesis, a threshold signcryption is proposed. It extends Zheng's digital signcryption 
ability to a group of people in such a way that at least a threshold number of group members are 
required to produce a valid signcrypted text. It is very useful in daily life application, especially 
when several executive directors in a company need to make an important decision. 
On the other hand, proxy signcryption scheme combines the functionality of proxy signing 
and encryption into a single operation. It solves the problem of transmitting secure and 
authenticated message by a networked computer with low computational power. Such scenario is 
very common nowadays as many people possess a portable digital assistant (PDA), which has a 
relatively low computational capacity. 
For instance, if someone uses the handheld device to book and buy a movie ticket securely 
over mobile phone network, it is advisable to delegate the computation to a computer with 
sufficient computational power. In this example, the buyer needs to authenticate his/her identity to 
the server by digital signature. Digital signing of a message is a computational intensive 
mathematical operation. Such heavy computation can be off-loaded to a more powerful computer 
by a proxy signcryption scheme. 
However, delegating some authoritative rights to a single proxy is dangerous and has no 
guarantee on the efficiency. It is dangerous because the proxy may go astray and use the 
delegated authoritative rights to do some bad things on behalf of the original principal. 
Delegation of rights, especially signing rights, is very common in mobile agent applications. In 
these applications, the host usually gives a task to a proxy mobile agent to accomplish. If the host 
just delegates the signing or signcryption rights to only a single proxy, it has no guarantee on the 
efficiency because the agent may face a kidnapping problem and hence the given task cannot be 
accomplished eventually. 
To alleviate the problems mentioned above, a threshold proxy signcryption scheme is 
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proposed. This scheme takes the balance between the two problems mentioned above. In this 
scheme, the participation of t proxy members out of a group of size n are required to produce a 
valid proxy signcrypted text. This solves the dangerous problem by avoiding the delegation of 
full rights to a single proxy. A threshold number of proxy members, instead of all members in a 
group, can produce a valid proxy signcrypted text also solves the kidnapping related problem. 
Finally, an un-cheatable non-repudiated (t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme is also 
proposed. It extends the proposed (t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme to include the 
support of non-repudiation. In the scheme, it requires the participation of t (out ofn) proxy agents 
to produce a valid proxy signcrypted text. The idea comes from the properties of secret sharing, 
proxy signing, encryption and blind signature scheme. The non-repudiation property eliminates 
the need for the existence of a trustworthy principal. Eventually, it turns the scheme to be a both 
proxy agent protected and principal protected threshold proxy signcryption scheme. The 
un-cheatable feature allows the honest party to terminate the protocol once the cheating event is 
detected. 
Last but not least, the proposed schemes are especially useful in mobile agent environment 
and useful in developing e-commerce businesses and applications as authenticity and 
confidentiality are crucial to these businesses and applications. Besides, our scheme is the first 
threshold proxy signcryption scheme, which can let the proxy agencies to carry out the 
signcryption in a threshold manner. 
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Appendix 
Papers Derived from this thesis: 
[1] W. K. Chan, and Victor K. Wei, “A Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme," Accepted for 
publication at 2002 International Conference on Security and Management (SAM'02), June 
24 - 27，2002. 
[2] W. K. Chan, and Victor K. Wei, "On Non-Repudiated and Un-cheatable Threshold Proxy 
Signcryption Scheme," Accepted for publication at 2002 ACM International Symposium on 
Information Security (InfoSecu02), July 10 - 13，2002. 
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